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Traditional narratives of external imbalances have focused 
on the analysis of national accounts, trade flows, and 
financial flows. They have generated two opposing views 
of the current situation of the world economy: on one 
side, a prudent, if not pessimistic view considers large 
imbalances as evidence of problems with the international 
monetary and financial system, and symptoms of 
domestic distortions (mainly in the United States and 
China). On the other side, a relaxed, if not optimistic 
view suggests that global imbalances are not anomalies 
but simply the predictable outcome of a world with 
increasingly globalized financial flows in search of the 
right mix of risks and returns. The former view prescribes 
that the two largest countries in the world rebalance 
their economies to avoid the potentially painful cost 
of disruption and adjustment. The latter contends that 
global imbalances will be corrected through time by the 
normal functioning of market forces.
This paper—a product of the Policy Review unit, Development Economics—is part of a larger effort in the department to 
study global imbalances and their implications for development strategies. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted 
on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at cmonga@worldbank.org.  
   This paper offers a critical analysis of these competing 
explanations of the United States-China imbalances and 
suggests a way of reconciling them. Starting with an 
exploration of the accounting frameworks that underpin 
any discussion of current account deficits and surpluses, 
the paper argues that China and the United States have 
become economically so interdependent that fears of any 
abrupt change in their current Nash equilibrium situation 
may be exaggerated. The paper also uses Hegel’s parable 
of the development of self-consciousness to explain the 
dynamics between the two countries. Hegel may not 
have been a great philosopher of history but his analysis 
of lordship and bondage (also known as the master-slave 
dynamics) provides a good framework for analyzing 
the dialectics of recognition and acknowledgement that 
currently characterizes the macroeconomic relationships 
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 “Pretend inferiority and encourage his arrogance.” 
Sun Tzu, The Art of War. 
 





At this year’s Paris Book Fair where I presented a small book of reflections, I 
was called upon by Alexandre Lacroix, the editor of the glamorous Philosophie 
Magazine, to write a piece for his journal on the convoluted macroeconomic 
relationship between the United States and China, from the perspective of 
philosophy. At first, I was taken aback by the request, which sounded both exotic 
and unusual. Sensing my surprise and skepticism, the journalist insisted and 
suggested that I use Hegel’s dialectics of lordship and bondage (also known as 
master and slave) to analyze the peculiar financial and economic dynamics between 
these two dominant countries. Although Lacroix seemed quite serious about his 
request, I did not think much about it, and respectfully declined the invitation. But 
it was a typical boring Parisian spring afternoon and I had little to do, except to sign 
a few books and politely answer unwise questions from a mostly uneducated 
audience. That left me with plenty of time to rethink about my exchange with the 
journalist. I eventually came to the conclusion that at least some aspects of his 
intriguing suggestion were worth pursuing.   
 
This paper takes up Lacroix’s challenge not from a purely philosophical 
perspective—though I will use Hegel’s concept of dialectics to underpin the 
discussion in the latter part of my analysis—but by focusing on the issue of global 
imbalances (the existence of large, sustained current account deficits in some 
countries that are compensated by equally large and sustained external surplus in 
others). Macroeconomists typically view these issues through the prism of the 
United States-China relationship. There is a good reason for this: anyone reading 
the chapter on current account balances in the World Factbook (the flagship 
publication of the United States (US) Central Intelligence Agency, which should be 
required reading for all macroeconomists) is struck by two pieces of information: 
the top-ranked country in the world with the largest current account surplus in 2008 
was China, with an estimated $426 billion. The lowest-ranking country (190 out of 
190) was the US, with an estimated deficit of $673 billion.
1 
                                                            
1 See https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2187rank.html 
The measure here is each country's net trade in goods and services, plus net earnings from 
rents, interest, profits, and dividends, and net transfer payments (such as pension funds and worker 
remittances) to and from the rest of the world during the period specified. These figures are 





While the global imbalance question is complex and involves other large 
economies such as Germany or Japan, it is useful to focus on the US and China: 
they are currently the two most dominant national economies in the world; China 
will shortly pass Japan to become the world's second largest economy behind the 
US and the two together accounted for almost one-half of all global growth during 
the four-year boom prior to the current global crisis; they are the two largest trading 
nations; the US is the largest deficit and debtor country while China is the largest 
surplus country and holder of dollar reserves; and they are the leaders of the two 
groups, the high-income industrialized countries and the emerging 
markets/developing nations, that each now account for about one-half of global 
output (Bergsten, 2009).   
 
The evolution of the US current account balance in recent years (Figure 1) and 
the accumulation of public debt have been subject to much debate. Economists 
have worried about the potential implications of the change of status of the largest 
economy in the world, from a creditor nation to a debtor nation. The rapid erosion 
of the US net external asset position has also raised concerns about the status of the 
dollar as the preeminent world currency. Expressing desperation, McKinnon 
recently noted that “economists have failed dismally to construct convincing 
theoretical models of why the seemingly endless US current account deficits are 
sustained by a seemingly endless willingness of the rest of the world to acquire 
dollar assets.”   
 
The main issue with large current account deficits is obviously their 
sustainability, that is, whether they will be met by sufficient, timely and affordable 
inflows of foreign capital. In the case of the US for instance, it bears on the 
questions of (i) the size of the financial obligations that the deficit reflects, (ii) the 
availability of income payments and receipts that will eventually be paid out of the 
economy’s production—with the risk of reducing current consumption and 
investment, and (iii) the confidence in creditor nations or in the low probability of 
sudden swings in the mood of foreign investors.
2 Although much of the public 
debate over current account deficits tend to focus on their size, the dynamics 
underlying the numbers are more important. After all, these deficits are simply the 
r e s u l t s  o f  m a n y  f o r c e s  a t  p l a y ,  i n  o t her words the reflection of the general 
                                                                                                                                                                  
historical data as far back as 1890, Eichengreen (1987) found that current levels of U.S. deficits have 
no precedent. 
2 A current account is considered ‘sustainable’ at a point in time “if neither it, nor the associated 
foreign capital inflows, nor the negative net international investment position are large enough to 
induce significant changes in economic variables, such as consumption or investment or interest 
rates or exchange rates. Even if the current account deficit is sustainable by this definition today, its 
trajectory could still be creating future risks for the US and global economy.” (Mann, 2002 : 134).  
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equilibrium interaction between many macroeconomic variables (national rates of 
saving and investment, fiscal, monetary and exchange rate policies, patterns of 
growth and international trade, etc.). Moreover—and this is one of the main 
arguments of this paper—these variable themselves reflect deeper macro-political 
and socio-cultural choices, which must be taken into consideration in the analysis of 
current account deficits.   
 
Why is the US, the world’s richest nation, borrowing heavily on international 
capital markets--rather than lending, as w o u l d  s e e m  m o r e  l o g i c a l ?  A n d  w h y  i s  
China giving credence to the Lucas Paradox
3 by using its excess savings to increase 
its claims and control on US assets, instead of pursuing potentially higher returns 
on investment in poor countries? Regardless of the particular lenses that they use to 
analyze the US-China imbalances (national income accounts, trade flows or 
financial flows), macroeconomists usually come to one of the following two 
opposite conclusions:  
   
  Global imbalances represent an anomaly and a major threat to the stability 
of the world economy. First, they may reflect domestic problems or 
distortions (lack of social insurance, poor firm governance or financial 
repression in surplus countries and excessive public borrowing in deficit 
countries); or problems with the international monetary system and 
exchange rate regimes (large accumulation of reserves for self-insurance 
purposes). Second, they may lead themselves to significant domestic 
problems such as capital flows volatility, especially when the exchange rate is 
fixed. Action should therefore be taken to cut the US external deficit and 
China’s external surplus. Both countries should adjust their saving rates (an 
increase in the US and a decrease in China). If one assumes that there is an 
upper limit to growth in China, an increase in the growth of domestic 
demand must be associated with a decrease in the growth of foreign 
demand, even not in the exact same proportion. This would require a 




  Global imbalances may not be as threatening as they appear because they 
reflect a general trend in world economic history and the structural changes 
associated with globalization. In a way, they are just the logical outcome of a 
world that is increasingly characterized by the increased integration of real 
                                                            
3 Lucas (1990) wondered why capital does not flow from rich to poor countries despite the fact 
that the latter have lower levels of capital per worker.  
4 This view is dominant in both academic and policy circles. It has been articulated forcefully by 
Obstfeld and Rogoff (2007) and Blanchard and Milesi-Ferretti (2009).  
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and financial markets. The low U.S. saving hypothesis should be seen 
therefore as unconvincing, not least because the national account data 
underestimates savings by excluding purchases of consumer durables and 
expenditure on education and research and development from the 
definition, and because the U.S. current account deficit started in the 
1990s—precisely when the external account balance swung into surplus.
5 
 
While these two opposing views often rely on some well-constructed theoretical 
and empirical underpinnings, they suggest a dichotomy that may not allow grasping 
fully the issues at hand. This paper offers a more nuanced view and argues that a 
more complete understanding of global imbalances requires a multidimensional 
perspective that more fully takes into account events beyond traditional 
macroeconomic variables. Global imbalances are neither just a temporary 
aberration that can be addressed through economic policy actions in the U.S. and 
China as suggested by proponents of the first view, nor are they only the result of 
globalization as implied by proponents of the second view. The paper uses Hegel’s 
dialectics to analyze the opposing dynamics of the U.S. and China external 
balances. While agreeing with the need for the two most dominant global powers 
on the world economic stage (U.S. and China) to take corrective action, it also 
suggests that eliminating global imbalances will require structural changes—some of 
them well beyond the realm of economics—that may take a long time to materialize. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 uses the basic 
accounting linkages to explain why traditional narratives of current account deficits 
and surpluses often lead to competing theories and conflicting results. Section 3 
suggests a game-theoretic approach of the U.S.-China economic relationship based 
on Hegel’s analysis of lordship and bondage, which explains the current situation of 





2.  Traditional Narratives of Global Imbalances 
 
The debate over global imbalances has been controversial, and at times 
confusing. On one side of the spectrum, there are those who lament the persistence 
                                                            
5 See Cooper (2005). The low savings hypothesis also appears inconsistent with the still low 
nominal and real interest rates, even before the relaxation of monetary policy to combat the 2008-09 
recession. Xafa (2007) notes that the U.S. national accounts data also exclude capital gains (e.g. on 




of a large current account deficit in the U.S. and interpret it as the sign of a country 
living well beyond its means and therefore doomed to suffer negative consequences 
at some point in the future. On the other side, there are those who only see a 
current account deficit as the sign that foreigners are willing to invest in that 
country’s firms, buy its Treasury obligations, bonds and stocks, hold its currency, 
and thereby making loans in exchange of purchases of imported goods and 
services. They view a large current account deficit as proof that the U.S. can attract 
investment from around the world by delivering high returns with better risk 
premium than others—a vote of confidence, the ultimate mark of trust in an 
economy that may have imbalances but is on the whole, well run. Good arguments 
can be made by both camps. In order to explore the issues at hand systematically, it 
is useful to first recall some of the basic accounting relationships that underpin 
international macroeconomics, and to assess the validity of the various lenses 
through which the issues are often discussed.  
 
2.1  Brief Anatomy of the Linkages 
 
The accounting frameworks for analyzing current account balances revolve 
around the three concepts of production, income and expenditures. Since the total 
value of output produced for any given country ( ) is also the total value of incomes 
paid out      , let’s start with the well-known national income identity for an open 
economy 
 
(1)                                                                  
 
where     is consumption,     is investment,     is government spending, and 
       is net exports.  
 
The value of incomes received by economic agents from the factors of 
production located anywhere in the world       equals the disposition of output 
in terms of total expenditures (consumption, investment, government spending), 
and whatever fraction of income is saved    . To aggregate,  
 
(2)                                                                   
 
where is     is expenditure and     is saving. Combining equations (1) and (2) 
yields 
 
(3a)                                                              
 




(3b)                                                           
 
We also know that       includes gross domestic product (   , value of 
output produced in a country, regardless of whether factors or production are 
owned by residents or nonresidents) plus net factor payments from abroad    ; 
that is 
 
(4)                                                                 
 
This allows us to bring into the picture the current account, which is simply the 
difference between a country's total exports of goods, services and transfers, and its 
total imports of them. It reflects net payments (deficit) or net receipts (surplus) for 
goods and services. It is therefore useful to frame the current account in terms of its 
relationship with income and spending. Total receipts are constituted of the income 
received by residents, which is GNP and net transfers     . Total payments are 
the sum of expenditure on goods and services and transfers made. Therefore, one 
can write  
 
(5)                                                                    
 
The total income plus net transfers received by residents of any country is 
either consumed, saved, or paid in taxes. This gives 
 
(6)                                                               
 
with  T as net taxes (taxes after all domestic transfer payments made by the 
government have been deducted). Total expenditure is the total of household 
consumption, government spending and investment spending by firms; substituting 
these identities in equation (5) yields. 
 
(7)                                                                  
 
These identities provide a lot of insights to issues of external imbalances. 
Applying them to the US-China situation, one can derive from them the following 
observations: 
 
  Looking closely at equation (3b), one can also see that net exports in China 
is only a reflection of the excess of national income over aggregate spending 
by domestic residents. The key lesson for the US is that an excess of 
imports over exports (a negative trade balance) only expresses the fact that  
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total spending exceeds national income. The implication is straightforward: 
the US-China imbalances reflect macroeconomic imbalances and any 
meaningful change in the situation will require rebalancing of income and 
spending in both countries. 
 
  China’s current account surplus reflects an excess of income over spending. 
To reduce it, the country will have to either increase its expenditures, or 
diminish its receipts. With a current account deficit, the US is obviously in 
the opposite situation. Any credible strategy to reduce external imbalances 
in both countries must be consistent with the accounting implications of the 
dynamics in the right-hand side of equation (5). Specifically, China’s surplus 
will be reduced only if its investment rises relative to saving or if its fiscal 
position deteriorates (equation 7).
6 In other words, one of the following 
must happen: either the Chinese private sector saves more than it invests, or 
the Chinese government must collect more in net taxes than it spends. 
 
  Also, because there is an accounting relationship between the fiscal position 
and the external balance, any change in the budget balance is reflected in 
the current account. This is particularly relevant for the US: a deterioration 
of the fiscal deficit must be compensated either by increased saving or by 
reduced investment to prevent a worsening of the current account deficit. 
But it would be misleading to identify any one of the balances in equation 
(7) and infer causality from the identity. They are simultaneously 
determined in a general equilibrium dynamics.  
 
Quantifying the factors underlying persistent current account deficits and the 
direction of causality with some degree of certainty can be a complicated exercise. 
Besides a rigorous econometrically fitted model with precise estimated coefficients, 
it requires a credible counterfactual scenario that can be used for comparison—
which implies some causal ordering of the simultaneously determined variables. 
Moving from these accounting identities to explore behavioral relationships among 
these variables is therefore the most challenging and controversial part of the 
debate. There are many different ways of understanding the dynamics of external 
imbalances, setting appropriate goals for surplus and deficit countries, and 
designing policies to achieve them. 
 
2.2  Competing Theories and Conflicting Results 
                                                            
6 This statement holds from the perspective of national income accounting. However, if the 
investment is used to build up production capacity in the tradable sector, the total output there will 
increase. Without a corresponding increase in domestic absorption, the increase in investment may 




Current account deficits and surpluses can be approached in many different 
ways. The traditional narratives on the US-China imbalances are usually analyzed 
for each of the two countries from three perspectives: (i) a domestic perspective 
based on national income and product accounts; (ii) an international perspective 
based on trade flows; and (iii), an international perspective based on flows and 
holdings of financial assets (Mann, 2002). 
 
2.2.1  The National Accounts Lenses 
 
The first approach typically uses national accounts to describe how patterns of 
domestic savings and investment are linked to trade and current account balances. 
It starts with the identity reflected in equation (3a) that domestic production equals 
total spending plus the trade balance. The sources of savings in any given economy 
can therefore be said to correspond to the demand for financial capital. To 
examine the national accounts identity from the perspective of the sources and uses 
of funds, one must disaggregate foreign and domestic variables, and public and 
private variables: private savings plus capital inflows (foreign savings) through the 
current account or trade deficit must equal private investment and the budget 
balance: 
 
(8)                                           X M Sp     T G I p    
 
This formulation helps make the point that the US trade deficit reflects a higher 
level of spending than its domestic production. As a consequence, fiscal deficits fuel 
current account deficits through their effect on national saving. This is the well-
known twin-deficits hypothesis: when a government increases its fiscal deficit—for 
instance by launching a fiscal stimulus package, by cutting taxes—domestic residents 
use some of their new income to consume more, causing national saving to decline. 
This trend in saving requires the country either to borrow from abroad or reduce 
its foreign lending, unless domestic investment decreases enough to offset the 
saving shortfall. Thus, a larger fiscal deficit is typically accompanied by a wider 
current account deficit.  
 
The story seems quite logical. Yet, empirical evidence has been hard to find in 
the US case, not least because the link between fiscal and current account deficits is 
not as straightforward as the accounting identities would suggest. While the US 
fiscal and current account deficits seemed to move in parallel during the first half of 
the 1980s, things have changed substantially since the early 1990s, raising doubts 
about the twin-deficit hypothesis: The US fiscal deficit rose from 2.7 to 5 percent of 
GDP in 1980-1986 while the current account deficit increased from 0 to 3.5  
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percent of GDP during the same period. The explanation seemed clear: 
expansionary fiscal policies led to strong growth through domestic spending and 
increase in imports. At the same time, tight monetary policy and the large fiscal 
deficit led to high interest rates, which attracted foreign investment and 
strengthened the dollar. The end-result was a decline in competitiveness and a large 
current account. Surprisingly, when the fiscal balance turned into surplus in the 
1990s, the current account continued to deteriorate. The contraction in fiscal policy 
did not lead to a reduction in domestic demand and a curtailing of imports. The 
lower fiscal deficit did not ease pressure on the cost of funds, lower interest rates, 
and induce a depreciation of the dollar—which would have been good for the 
current account. To the contrary, there was a significant appreciation of the dollar 
in the 1990s. 
 
The US story is comparable to Japan’s of the 1990s, when the evolution of the 
current account seemed inconsistent with the sharp decline in the country’s fiscal 
balance—it was an example of private savings rising to compensate a deteriorating 
fiscal stance, to the point of leaving the current account unaffected. It also confirms 
results from various cross-country empirical studies that often fail to establish a 
clear chain of causality between the twin deficits, not least because they use data on 
a very small sample of countries, focused on short periods of time.
7 Such 
“anomalies” are hardly surprising since equations (1) through (8) have no causal 
significance. Because they are identities, all variables are endogenously determined 
as part of a general equilibrium outcome for the whole international economy. The 
three sectoral balances—saving-investment balance (S – I), the government deficit (G 
– T), and the trade or current account deficit (M – X) are in fact functions of many 
other variables such as national income, interest and exchange rates, etc.  
 
The weakness of the twin-deficit hypothesis pertains to its definition of current 
account balances in isolation of changes in other influential variables such as public 
debt or the real exchange rate. A possible way of rehabilitating (at least partially) the 
twin-deficit hypothesis is to adopt a two-step analysis of the relationship between 
fiscal and current account deficits: first, one needs to look at the link between fiscal 
policy and national savings,
8 which itself is controversial:  
                                                            
7 The literature on the subject is quite confusing. In an influential study, Miller and Russek 
(1989) found fiscal deficits to be the main determinants of trade deficits. Kim and Roubini (2003) 
and Gruber and Kamin (2005) either found no link between the two, or concluded that there was a 
link in the opposite direction of the one predicted by the twin-deficit hypothesis. 
8 Bartolini and Lahiri (2006) adopt a cross-country methodology for 26 industrial and emerging 
economies and find that each dollar rise in fiscal deficits is associated with an average rise in private 
consumption of 33 to 37 cents. While their finding supports the proposition that consumption 
responds significantly to fiscal policy changes, their estimated rise in consumption is smaller than the 




  A Keynesian approach would predict that expansionary fiscal policies lower 
national savings by increasing private disposable income and hence private 
consumption; if the economy is closed to external capital flows, reduced 
savings must be offset by reduced domestic investment and fiscal policy 
crowds out domestic investment by inducing higher interest rates. If the 
economy is open, domestic investment remains stable because foreign 
credit keeps interest rates stable. 
 
  The Ricardian view would predict that fiscal stimulus packages (new public 
spending, tax cuts) financed through new public debt does not lead to 
significant changes in consumption or current account balance because 
private agent anticipate future tax increases to repay additional public debt 
and choose to save the windfall from the government. 
 
The second step is to consider the implications of these fiscal policy effects on 
current account balances. One popular method consists of quantifying the link 
between fiscal policy and domestic investment, which allows an estimation of the 
required level of foreign financing needed to close the savings-investment gap. Yet, 
there again, so many factors affect investment behavior (productivity, domestic 
interest rates, foreign interest rates, etc.) that this strategy carries many risks.
9 A 
different line of enquiry consists of replacing consumption with the current account 
balance as the variable to be explained in regression equations. This substitution 
enables to estimate a direct link between fiscal balances and external deficits. It is 
pursued by Bartolini and Lahiri (2006). They find that each dollar rise in the fiscal 
deficit is associated on average with a 30 cent decline in the current account. 
Combined with their other finding that each dollar rise in the fiscal deficit leads to a 
decline in national savings of 33 to 37 cents, this suggests that changes in national 
savings are translated almost one-for-one in changes in current accounts, which 
implies that investment only has a weak relationship with fiscal policy.  
 
Whether one believes in the twin-deficit hypothesis or not, the fact is that the 
causality chain often observed between the fiscal and the current account balances 
has been unstable in the U.S., most notably during the 1990s. The potential 
                                                            
9 Economic theory identifies three main determinants to business environment: GDP growth, 
the rental cost of capital (the cost of purchasing and holding investment goods), and equity value, 
that is the market value of firms relative to their underlying capital assets typically denoted in the 
literature as q (when the stock market values firms and their future prospects highly, investments in 
physical assets are more profitable for firms than financial investments such as stocks repurchases, 
mergers and acquisitions). McCarthy (2001) presents an empirical forecasting model with these 




explanations given for the breakdown (such as the emergence of the “new 
economy”, which led to cost reduction, efficiency gains, and productivity 
enhancement and thus created a wedge between private savings and private 
investment), do not invalidate some other approaches to global imbalances.  
 
2.2.2  The Trade Flows Lenses 
 
The second popular approach to the analysis of current account deficits focuses 
on trade flows. Foreign investors do not automatically respond to changes in 
national accounts in deficit countries as may be inferred from the first approach. 
Chinese central bankers or Japanese pension managers have no obligation to invest 
in US Treasury bills to help America cover its current account deficit as implied by 
the previous discussion. That a country's imports far exceed its exports is a topic for 
newspaper headlines and a matter concern to many citizens and pressure groups 
(whose livelihoods depend on the viability of exporting and import-competing 
industries, trade unions, business groups, nationalistic politicians). Yet, specific 
trade-related factors cannot explain by themselves large and sustained current 
account imbalances, which are in fact determined by many other variables, 
including foreign and domestic incomes, asset prices, interest rates, and exchange 
rates. It is clear for instance that over-consumption (mostly of imported goods) and 
asset bubbles in the US during the period 2002-07 were partly caused by loose 
monetary policy. This obviously affected global imbalances.
10 
 
It therefore seems useful to examine the more fundamental driving forces that 
explain the flows of exports and imports of goods and services, and to understand 
their underlying dynamics and the various ways in which the exchange rate and 
GDP growth, both at the national and international levels, influence the current 
account. The conventional way of doing this is to rely on models that show how 
trade flows are driven by changes in relative prices and growth of national income.
11 
This highlights the close relationship between GDP growth and real import and 
export growth.  
 
Empirical studies following that path have confirmed that (i) exports grow faster 
when foreign income grows faster and when the relative price of exports to 
competing products in the destination market falls; and (ii), imports grow faster 
                                                            
10 Lin (2008) argues convincingly that expansion of 2002-07 began with a bang – the bursting of 
the US tech-stock bubble in 2000-01, which had a substantial wealth effect on American households.  
To minimize the duration and depth of the ensuing recession, the Federal Reserve aggressively 
eased monetary policy by lowering he Fed funds rate or the discount rate 27 times between January 
2001 and June 2003. While expansionary monetary policy averted a deeper recession by stimulating 
a boom in the housing market, it fueled a consumption boom. 
11 One such model is proposed by Marquez and Ericsson (1993).  
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when domestic income grow faster and when the relative price of imports to 
domestic products falls. Mann (2002) presents data about the US experience, 
showing that when the dollar depreciated sharply between 1986 and 1989, the 
relative price of American imports tended to rise, making domestic products more 
attractively priced in their destination markets. During that period, imports grew 
more slowly than would have been expected on the basis of US GDP growth, while 
exports increased more quickly than would have been expected on the basis of real 
foreign GDP growth alone. 
 
Analyses of the US-China external imbalances too often neglect to take account 
of the difference in their stages of development and the implied difference in their 
product mixes. China currently produces and exports to the U.S. some basic 
necessity, labor intensive goods, which the US will not produce anymore. An 
appreciation of renminbi may reduce China’s exports and trade surplus. But it may 
also lead to a higher trade deficit in the U.S. because the demand for such products 
in America is inelastic, and the U.S. would have to pay higher costs either for its 
imports from China, or from other higher-cost countries. Solving the external 
imbalances problem among the two countries may therefore a reduction in the U.S. 
trade deficit more than a decline in China’s trade surplus. 
 
Empirical studies, which are typically based on real-side models, also tend to 
focus exclusively on trade flows and to ignore capital flows and portfolio 
optimization. The adjustment process is assumed to work through the global 
reallocation of demand between tradable versus nontradable goods, and domestic 
versus foreign goods. Moreover, these studies have also led consistently to what can 
be called the puzzle of income asymmetry: whenever goods and services are 
aggregated, the US income elasticity for imports is much greater than the foreign 
i n c o m e  e l a s t i c i t y  f o r  U S  e x p o r t s .  T h i s  result, observed in many studies since 
Houthakker and Magee (1969), holds regardless of the estimation periods, datasets 
and econometric techniques used.
12 That intriguing asymmetry reflects the fact that 
changes in US income affect US imports very differently from the way changes in 
world income affect US exports. Its main implication is that even if the US 
economy and the world economy grow at the same rate in the foreseeable future, 
the US current account deficit will continue to deteriorate, unless there is a 
sustained depreciation of the dollar. While some researchers consider that the US 
income puzzle simply reflects gaps in knowledge (missing variables, failure to 
account for demographic shifts and capital outflows such as remittances that 
aggravate the current account deficit, etc.), the trade flows story is still unsettled. 
                                                            
12 Hooper et al. (1998) found that the long-run elasticity of US exports with respect to foreign 
national income was 0.80, while the elasticity of US imports with respect to US national income was 




2.2.3  The Financial Flows Lenses 
 
A third approach to the analysis of US-China imbalances therefore focuses on 
international financial flows, their determinants and their signification. The main 
rationale often put forward for shifting the focus of the analysis from the current to 
the capital account is the increasing importance of financial market operations 
across boundaries, and the observation that they may have become the single most 
dominant forces fuelling globalization (Cooper, 2005). The trends are impressive 
indeed: for example, gross foreign purchases of foreign securities from US 
residents, topped $8 trillion in 2008. While the exponential trend in the gross value 
of international transactions has not yet rendered obsolete the two previous 
approaches (national accounts and trade lenses), it justifies the renewed focus of 
external imbalance analysis on issues such as interest rates in financial markets, 
differential rates of return, exchange rates, optimal portfolio allocation strategies, 
financial regulation, availability of innovative financial instruments, etc.  
 
That third approach is broadly based on the view that external balance 
problems are primarily monetary in nature.  Therefore, global imbalances should 
also be analyzed as symptoms of excessive money supply. There are several 
possible rationales for that view: first, conceptually, going back to equation (7), it is 
logical that any current account deficit could be suppressed through a sufficient 
contraction of the money stock, which raises interest rates, reduces public and 
private spending, contracts economic activity and induces declines in income and 
imports. Second, there are some direct links between the balance of payment 
deficit, foreign exchange market interventions and the money supply: when the 
central bank in a deficit country sells foreign exchange and receives in return high-
powered money, that process automatically reduces the money stock. By contrast, 
when the central bank of a surplus country buys foreign exchange, it also increases 
the outstanding stock of high-powered money—a process that expands the money 
stock. It is therefore logical that some researchers would focus on the accounting 
linkages between the money supply and the external balance, and try to identify the 
financial variables that are the most relevant in any given situation. 
 
The current account balance always equals the change in net foreign assets of 
any given country. In case of a surplus, it indicates the rate at which the economy is 
building claims on the rest of the world. In case of a deficit, it reflects claims being 
built by the world on the national economy. Because the change in net foreign 
assets itself equals the change in money stock minus the change in total domestic 
credit, one can write balance sheet identities to clarify the link between the financial 




(9)                                                     ∆    
 
where ∆    is the change in net foreign assets for the entire country (central 
bank, commercial banks, the treasury, and the nonbank private sector). Analyzing 
the evolution of the current account balances in the U.S. and China from that 
perspective requires that one focuses on issues of money, credit, and deficit finance. 
For that purpose, it is convenient to highlight the change in the central bank’s net 
foreign assets, often a major component of the total change in net foreign assets. 
One can write: 
 
(10)                                  ∆       ∆     ∆       
                                            
where ∆   is the change in money stock, and ∆   is the change in total domestic 
credit, and   is the component of the net foreign assets that do not belong to the 
consolidated banking system.
13 Like all identities, equations (1-10) obviously do not 
tell anything about the behavioral relationships among the variables involved, nor 
does it show the many possible channels through which capital moves around the 
world. Moreover, the structural design flaw of a global financial system built around 
a single currency as the world’s reserve: for surplus countries such as China to 
acquire and hold dollars, the US must run a sustained current account deficit. In 
other worlds, for the current global financial order to function, the US must in 
essence live well beyond its means.
14  
 
Given the constraints of equations (7) and (8), there is room for debate over 
how much influence deficit and surplus countries actually have in a globalized 
world of financial flows and international capital markets. There is little doubt that 
the emerging countries crises of the 1990s sparked a new insurance strategy from 
Asian countries, which consists of keeping their currencies artificially low to 
stimulate exports, and accumulating foreign reserves as precaution. This also 
                                                            
13 To some researchers, equation (10) linking the current account deficit (the change in net 
foreign assets) to the change in M2 minus domestic credit should be written simply as      
 ∆ 2   ∆  , which is an oversimplification. NFA here are for the consolidated banking system, 
not the whole economy. In particular, foreign assets include non-monetary assets like direct 
investment that are in no way the backing for monetary expansion. Countries do not have to run 
current account deficits to increase the global stock of their reserve assets, but they have to run 
balance of payments deficits (the sum of current and capital accounts). For most years until the 
1970s, the U.S. ran current account surpluses, but balance of payments deficits. 
14 Triffin (1961) made a similar point when he wrote about the accumulation of dollars in 
Europe in the 1950s and argued that the international financial system carried the seeds of its own 
destruction. Wolf (2008) provides a rich and convincing update of Triffin’s intuition.  
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allowed some of them to procrastinate on the implementation of politically difficult 
structural reforms of their economies.
15  
 
One could argue that the US had to increase consumer demand in order to 
absorb excess goods from China without suffering high levels of unemployment. 
Another way of looking at global imbalances from the perspective of equation (8) is 
to consider that the US Federal Reserve may have perceived the relatively low price 
levels in the US in the period 2002-2007 as a reflection of weak demand (instead of 
a reflection of the surplus of low cost goods from Asia), and kept interest rates low 
for a long period of time, which fuelled the assets and real estate bubble (Lin 2008). 
Capital flows may also have been attracted to the U.S. either because of its better 
growth record relative to other competing markets (say the Euro area or Japan), or 
because emerging markets could not offer similar levels of reliability in their savings 
instruments or investment opportunities.
16 Regardless of the explanation given to 
the rise of the US-China imbalances, the end-result has been a massive 
accumulation of dollars on the balance sheets of Asian central banks, followed by 
investment by these institutions in the American bond market. This process kept 
money flowing into the US, lowered long-term interest rates and created a spiral: it 
made domestic credit even cheaper in America, which became a sort of mega-bank, 
attracting short-term deposits from surplus countries and recycled them into risky 
assets (Monga 2009). Not surprisingly, the US’s international assets and liabilities 
rose from some $5 trillion in 1996 to over $20 trillion in 2007.  
 
This evolution set fears that the world’s mega-bank could theoretically become 
vulnerable to a run, which would destabilize capital markets around the world. Yet, 
so far, the catastrophe has been avoided. While the flood of money both from 
abroad and from within may have overwhelmed the capacity of the US financial 
system to handle it—despite the heavy use of securitization and other exotic 
financial instruments—American consumers have been able to absorb excess 
exports from Asia, at the costs of high levels of debt.  
 
In theory, there is always the danger that persistent deficits in the US can 
eventually be perceived to be unsustainable, which would dry up the inflow of 
                                                            
15 From 1993 to 1996, wages in China rose from 50 percent of GDP to 54 percent but then 
beginning in 1999 and over the next eight years, declined to 40 percent of GDP (World Bank, 
2008). This compares with about 56 percent in the U.S. 
16 Caballero et al. (2006) propose a portfolio balance model that analyzes the impact of shocks 
on global capital flows and interest rates. Their analysis suggests that U.S. assets have been 
underpinned by the economy’s good performance and relatively high interest rates; also, the liquid 
and sophisticated U.S. financial market has been able to attract larger portions of cross-border flows 
seeking high risk-adjusted returns that emerging countries, where there are often much weaker 
property rights, stronger capital controls and macroeconomic volatility.  
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foreign capital—with the consequences of a collapse in confidence in the dollar and 
a high cost of capital. This explains the calls for the world economy to face the 
dilemma of external imbalances: by definition, Asian exports (mainly Chinese) 
must be reconciled with imports of the rest of the world (mainly the US). Strategies 
for achieving that goal are well known. Yet, they have so far seemed inapplicable in 
the U.S.-China situation. 
 
2.3  Strategies for Reducing External Deficits: The Asymptotic Frontier 
 
The lessons from accounting identities are straightforward: in order to reduce 
the US current account deficit—and the corresponding China surplus—less spending 
should be directed to US imports, and/or more to exports. This can be done either 
through adjustment policies that reduce the level of aggregate demand (Option 1), 
or through expenditure switching policies that affect the composition of demand 
(Option 2), or through a combination of the two strategies. 
 
Option 1 is rarely an easy one, especially given its short-term macroeconomic 
costs and its potential political economy implications—it would imply a reduction in 
economic output growth in the US and a decline in demand for imports from 
China and elsewhere. As observed in 2007-08, lower American demand tends to 
create a global slowdown unless compensatory fiscal stimulus packages are 
implemented abroad. In principle, it is possible that a reduction in spending in the 
US could be matched by an equivalent increase in foreign demand sufficient to 
cover the country’s deficit without perturbations in the level of economic activity. In 
reality, expansionary macroeconomic policies in foreign countries on the scale 
needed to compensate for declining US demand also carry serious inflationary risks 
and can be politically costly. Furthermore, few countries would have the fiscal space 
to sustain large stimulus packages. 
 
By default, Option 2 is typically the least inconvenient. Still, it would involve a 
redirection of US domestic demand from cheap Chinese imports to products made 
in the US. If the government comes up with clever ways to induce that change, the 
switching of expenditures leads to a decline in domestic demand relative to total 
output in the US (due to higher total spending on US goods and services), which is 
likely to contribute to a reduction of the trade and current account deficits. From 
the perspective of the US and assuming that the country is willing to absorb the 
sociopolitical economic costs of giving up cheap imports, the major question then is 
how to use fiscal and monetary policy tools to smoothly induce these changes in 
consumption patterns. 
 
There are two options for implementing expenditure switching policies: first, 
trade policy (higher tariffs, quantitative restrictions on imports, specific “Buy- 
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America”-type provisions in national stimulus packages or export subsidies) can be 
use to force changes in trade flows. But they often lead to retaliatory measures from 
trading partners. In May 2009 for instance, the US decided to impose new tariffs on 
steel pipe imports from China. A few weeks later, China retaliated by slapping new 
barriers on U.S. and European Union (EU) exports of some industrial chemicals 
used to make nylon and polyester resin. This prompted the EU in turn to restrict 
imports of steel pipe from China… It appears that the count of newly imposed 
protectionist policies has been on the rise recently.
17 Moreover, in a country with a 
flexible exchange rate system such as the US, the theoretical reduction in the trade 
deficit that might be gained from trade restrictions would be offset by an 
appreciation of the dollar in reaction to trade restrictions. 
 
The second possibility, which is to induce a switching of expenditures through a 
real depreciation of the exchange rate, seems more realistic. But there are several 
possible ways to proceed, each carrying its own risks. The typical textbook 
recommendation would be to reduce the value of the dollar through a mix of 
macroeconomic policies (easing of monetary policy and tightening of fiscal policy, 
compensated by expansionary fiscal policies abroad). In theory, this could lower the 
value of the dollar without impacting negatively the pace of growth in the US, and 
lead to an improvement in the trade and current account balance. But besides the 
difficulty of orchestrating such a delicate coordination of policies across boundaries, 
the economic and political context in the US is not propitious to fiscal adjustment—
especially one based on expenditure restraint. In order to battle recession and avoid 
a slump like Japan suffered in the 1990s, the US authorities have implemented a 
v e r y  a g g r e s s i v e  f i s c a l  p o l i c y ,  w i t h  l a r g e and costly new economic stimulus and 
financial stability plans. The trajectory of fiscal policy is unlikely to change soon 
given the size of entitlement programs, the projected cost of the healthcare reform 
and other programs under consideration such as a one-time payment to Social 
Security recipients and the extension of the home buyers tax break. 
 
When fiscal correction is difficult to implement, the only option left is that of 
real exchange rate depreciation mainly through market mechanisms. There has 
always been a lively debate on whether a depreciation of the dollar is actually 
needed to achieve a substantial reduction of the US current account deficit in a 
world characterized by integrated capital markets. To this day, many economists 
and policymakers support the popular view that world imbalances could be 
remedied through increased demand in surplus countries and reduced demand in 
deficit countries without real exchange rate adjustment. That line of argument is 
                                                            
17 Bown (2009) examines newly available data from the Global Antidumping Database tracking 
the worldwide use of trade remedies such as antidumping, countervailing duties, global safeguards 
and China-specific safeguards in recent months. He finds an increase in resort to these instruments.   
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based on the erroneous belief that global imbalances have little to do with exchange 
rates because a trade deficit is simply an accounting difference between investment 
and savings, period. It ignores the relative price effects of international transfers of 
resources, as explained by McKinnon: “With smoothly functioning capital markets, 
little or no change in the ‘real’ exchange rate is necessary to transfer saving from 
one country to another.” (1984: 14)
18 In other words, with capital being available 
around the world and mobile across boundaries, savings-investment gaps are 
automatically reflected in trade balances, and this leaves no role for relative price 
changes. Such reasoning naturally leads to the conclusion that adjustments in trade 
and current account balances require changes in the real exchange rate only if the 
economy is closed to capital movements. 
 
Is that actually the case? Let’s imagine a two-country world with almost full 
employment where the US reduces total spending while China increases its 
spending by the same amount. Despite the mobility of capital, because China 
spends less on American goods and services at the margin than does the US, a 
redistribution of world spending from the US to China will reduce the demand for 
American goods and services at constant relative prices. In other words, most of the 
decline in US spending would be detrimental to sales of US-produced goods and 
services. One important reason for this is the fact that the price of Chinese products 
sold in the US also includes distribution, marketing, and overhead costs in the US. 
In the meantime, a much smaller fraction of the higher spending taking place in 
China will benefit American producers.  
 
In the end, the net effect of the reallocation of spending in the two countries 
will lead to an excess supply of American goods and services, and excess demand 
for Chinese goods and services—others things equal.
19 One of three things must 
therefore happen: inflation in China, deflation in the US, or a depreciation of the 
dollar. Assuming that the People’s Bank of China would not let a sustained rise in 
prices and that deflation is difficult to tackle because of the stickiness of prices in 
nominal terms,
20 then a lower relative price of US output is the necessary condition 
for reducing the imbalances. One can therefore conclude that changes in demand, 
                                                            
18 That view was already expressed by Mundell (1962). 
19 This is the so-called transfer problem debated by J.M. Keynes and Bertil Ohlin in the 1920s 
and nicely modeled in Krugman (1992), chapter 1. For a cross-country empirical analysis, see Lane 
and Milesi-Ferretti (2004). 
20 Ball and Mankiw (2004) present a “manifesto” of sticky prices. Monacelli (2000) uses a 
dynamic general equilibrium model of a small open economy to explain the puzzle observed by 
Mussa (1986): when countries move from fixed to flexible exchange rates, their nominal exchange 
rate and the real exchange rate become more variable, while relative inflation rates remain within a 
narrow band. It appears that floating exchange rates moves widely but there is rigidity in the 
adjustment of prices (domestic prices in domestic currency are sticky).  
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both in surplus and deficit countries, should be complemented by changes in real 
e x c h a n g e  r a t e s .  I n  t h e  c a s e  a t  h a n d ,  higher savings in the US and increased 
consumption in China can only be sustained if complemented by real depreciation 
of the dollar and real appreciation of the renminbi—unless China agrees to face 
excess capacity—an unlikely proposition given its potential widespread economic 
and political consequences. 
 
If the real exchange rate option is indeed the most effective possibility for 
addressing the US-China imbalances, why is it not being used? Why is the obvious 
solution to the problem so often perceived as an unreachable asymptotic frontier? 
Abstracting from macro-political problems that underline international relations 
between powerful countries, the main reason is that the trade imbalance between 
US and China reflects the structural problems in both countries: from the 
American perspective, the key issue is how to sustain an economic and social 
growth model based on (over) consumption, low household savings and large fiscal 
deficits.  
 
For China, reforming the financial sector and the natural resources sector, 
eliminating the large monopolistic enterprises that create distortions in certain 
sectors of the economy and addressing the widening income disparity are daunting 
issues.
21 An exchange rate reform in China may indeed offer a number of benefits 
as it would allow the central bank to bring the growth of money supply and the 
overheated economy under better control. It would also change relative prices by 
lowering import costs, rebalance growth from a heavily-dependent exports model 
towards a consumer-oriented model, and help restructure the economy. But it 
could also bring some major political economy challenges. Besides the potential 
political cost of appearing to bow to pressures from Western countries, a sharp 
appreciation of the renminbi would raise the cost of Chinese exports abroad and 
generate unemployment in some sectors.
22 China’s structural rigidities therefore 
make it unlikely that the root cause of global imbalances will be addressed in the 
short term. 
 
Although the traditional narratives discussed above provide good insights for 
examining global imbalances, they do not fully explain the phenomenon they 
describe. Moreover, they do not address the deeper philosophical and political 
meanings of the deliberate economic strategies and policy measures adopted both 
                                                            
21 Lin (2009) notes that he concentration of income in large and wealthy corporations suppresses 
consumption and increases saving, investment as well as production capacity, which in turns lead to 
the emergence of a large trade surplus. 
22 It is estimated that despite a high rate of growth in 2009—in the order of 8 percent—that has 
led the world out of recession, China’s exports will decline by about 20 percent and at least 20 
million jobs will be lost in the coastal provinces of the country.  
21 
 
in deficits and surpluses countries. It is therefore necessary to go beyond accounting 
identities and analyze the true motives of the observed behavioral relationships. 
 
3.  A Useful Parable: The Hegelian Dialectics 
 
Economics benefits both from rigorous analytics and mathematical modeling 
that help clarify the assumptions underlying each decision and from the integration 
of lessons of other disciplines (Monga, 2009). A good understanding of the issues 
of global imbalances requires such an integrative approach. This section suggests a 
simple, game-theoretic framework that explains the current global imbalances as an 
illustration of the Nash equilibrium. It considers the US-China macroeconomic and 
macro-political relationships, and analyzes reasons why both countries may be 
caught in a Hegelian master-slave dialectics. It concludes that regardless of their 
rivalry, ideological differences, or levels of mutual disdain, China and the US are 
economically bound together in the foreseeable future. Leaders on both sides 
understand this quite well and their policy decisions, including on the dollar-






3.1  The Desire of Nations 
 
Hegel’s analysis of the dynamics of self-consciousness (Hegel, 1977), in which 
he discusses the master-slave dialectics, is a useful framework for understanding the 
persistence of the issues of global imbalances, and more generally, the enigma of 
the relationship between the US and China. It offers a credible narrative of the 
encounter between two self-conscious beings going through the process of self-
discovery, violent confrontation, and enslavement, only to realize that 
interdependence and mutual reliance are in fact the optimal choice at their 




23 The suggestion here is that the U.S.-China macroeconomic relationship should be studied as a 
noncooperative game that slowly evolved into a cooperative game. Noncooperative games are not 
games in which players do not cooperate, but those in which any cooperation must be self-enforcing. 
The two countries have always been assumed to hold discussions, to coordinate policies when it 
suited their goals, to transmit threats, and to make trustworthy promises. However, on sensitive 
economic issues such as the dollar-reminbi exchange rate, there has really been little coalition 
formation or other modes of collusion among them. For a long time, they were in fact unable to 




The story begins with two self-consciousnesses confronting each other. At first, 
each sees the other as identical and thinks about the other as another self. This puts 
them in the position to be mirrors of one another, and to reflect not only who they 
think they are but also what they appear in each other’s image. This spiral of 
perceptions and meanings goes on indefinitely, to the point of anger and paralysis. 
Then, they realize that a fight to death is the only way to break out from the self-
hypnotizing cycle. The confrontation leads to a clear definition of status: the winner 
becomes the master and the loser is the slave.  
 
But that is not the end of the story. In fact, it is actually the beginning. Having 
gone through the fight to death to define their respective selves and reclaim their 
identities, it becomes obvious that a dead adversary would not be of any use for the 
living. In fact, the winner would be the true loser: without the dead (the other 
symmetrical self-consciousness), the winner would miss the platform for his own 
freedom, the source of meaning to his status and therefore very reason for his/her 
existence. This is because the supreme objective of any self-consciousness is 
recognition—and acknowledgement of superiority. In conclusion, the winner is 
better off sparing the life of the loser and enslaving him/her. The relationship thus 
changes to an oppressive one, with the master dominating the slave who has 
surrendered and getting all wishes done through coercion. The winner has power 
but the loser cultivates resentment and hatred. 
 
Still, that conclusion does not resolve the existential problem of the master, who 
would have liked to gain self-esteem and recognition from a peer, an equal, not 
from a slave, and certainly through respect and admiration—not through fear. 
Moreover, as time goes by, the dynamics of the relationship evolves surreptitiously: 
through learning by doing and experience, the slave gets better and better at his 
role, while the master gets accustomed to relying on the servant. This creates 
addiction and laziness, to the point that the master becomes totally dependent on 
the slave, who has been “transformed into a truly independent consciousness”—to 
use Hegel’s phrase. In fact, having confronted death during the struggle before 
surrendering, the slave turns into the stronger of the two. His skills as a servant give 
him prominence and cancel out the power of the master. The master may be under 
the illusion that he controls the slave; the truth of the matter is that the latter has as 
much power as the former. Unsatisfied with such discoveries, the master 
progressively realizes that he is on shaky psychological grounds, and that they each 
would benefit from cooperation and mutual exchange rather than from 
domination. We are now in the perfect Nash equilibrium where the set of strategies 
                                                                                                                                                                  
find themselves in a cooperative game—i.e., a game in which both countries can enforce agreements 
through outside parties.  
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available to the master and the slave is such that no one has incentive to unilaterally 
change his actions.  
 
Like all parables, this one should obviously not be interpreted literally. In fact, 
taking a critical step back from Hegel’s framework, we might consider the obvious 
fact that the US and China have never really fought. Still, the master-slave dialectics 
is a useful framework of analysis for the US-China imbalances. It shows what how 
two countries—each thinking about the other in terms of the self—evolve from their 
primitive forms of self-consciousness to a superior form of interdependence and 
economic cooperation. First, it helps link economics and history, as it suggests that 
no conscious agent (in this case a country) is self-conscious a priori; instead, the 
agent must discover and enunciate their conception of the self through experience 
and confrontation. While China prides its five thousand years of history (by 
opposition to the mere couple of centuries of the US), it has always needed an alter 
ego or a challenger to define and develop its own identity. The specifics of this 
historical process of self-discovery will always be subject to debate among 
philosophers and historians: some explaining China’s or the US’s stance on the 
world’s stage by giving preeminence to internal dynamics within these two 
countries; others would argue that all dominant countries need an external sparring 
partner to define who they are (or who they would like to be perceived). In this 
analysis of the US-China imbalances, I would take the view that while these two 
views are not mutually exclusive, the development of self-awareness eventually 
requires the confrontation of two broadly separate entities—in this case, two 
important countries. 
 
Just like human beings, countries possess the desire to assert themselves and 
the urge to transform the world in a way that suits their defined interests. This leads 
them to adopt actions that require recognition of their power and importance, and 
ultimately reveal self-consciousness. If Hegel were a macroeconomist, he probably 
would have described the evolution of the US-China relationship in the following 
sequence: first, the two countries ignore each other; second, each sees the other as a 
rival consciousness. After the industrial revolution and the coming to age of the US 
as the dominant world power, China, self-proclaimed and formerly known as the 
Celestial Empire (Tianchao天朝), the Land of Deities (Shenzhou神州), or the 
Middle Kingdom (Zhongguo 中国),
24 finds itself surreptitiously pushed towards the 
periphery of history. To use Sartre’s metaphor (2003) describing the Hegelian 
process, the world ceased to be centered on China; it moved away to a new, 
different center.  
 
                                                            
24 I rely here on the mandarin language expertise of my colleague Xubei Luo.  
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America quickly became the word-economy,
25 and remained so throughout 
most of the twentieth century with its power culminating during the collapse of 
communism and the fall of the Berlin Wall. Echoing Francis Fukuyama’s theme of 
the end of History, President Bill Clinton exulted that the US has become “the 
world's mightiest industrial power; saved the world from tyranny in two world wars 
and a long cold war; and time and again, reached out across the globe to millions 
who, like us, longed for the blessings of liberty. Along the way, Americans 
produced a great middle class and security in old age; built unrivaled centers of 
learning and opened public schools to all; split the atom and explored the heavens; 
invented the computer and the microchip; and deepened the wellspring of justice 
by making a revolution in civil rights for African Americans and all minorities, and 
extending the circle of citizenship, opportunity and dignity to women…. America 
stands alone as the world's indispensable nation. Once again, our economy is the 
strongest on earth.” (1997) "We are the greatest country in the world, said US 
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, and what we are doing is serving the role of 
the indispensable nation to see what we can do to make the world safer for our 
children and grandchildren and for those people around the world who follow the 
rules." (1998). 
 
At the dawn of the twenty-first century, the balance of power has been adjusted 
and the two countries have reached the Hegelian stage of mutual dependence. The 
ideological hatred, deep suspicions and geopolitical battles of the Cold War have, 
have left place to recognition of the fact that while the US remains the dominant 
global superpower with large economic, commercial, and technological resources, 
the world is no longer unipolar. In the mid-twentieth century, China and the United 
States had virtually no trade relations and no direct diplomatic contacts. Yet, as 
Mann (2000) points out, by the 1990s, economic ties between the two countries had 
become such a driving force that the Chinese knew that all American threats—most 
importantly the threat of revoking Most Favored Nation trade status—were empty. 
Indeed, by the end of the century, the two nations were major trading partners 
                                                            
25 French historian Braudel used the term “world-economy” (économie-monde) in his work on 
The Mediterranean to define the appropriate unit of economic and social analysis. Borrowing it 
from German geographer Fritz Rörig, who first used it in the 1920s (Weltwirtschaft), he noted that a 
clear distinction should be made with “the economy of the world” (économie mondiale). “World-
economy” means “an economy that is the world”. See Braudel (1984). The distinction is more than 
rhetorical. At the conceptual level, a “world-economy” implies that the world in not a reified given 
entity that is there, and within which an economy is constructed; rather, the economic relations are 
actually defining the boundaries of the social world. Also, “world-economy” needs not to involve the 
entire globe but any given geographic space where several countries interact intensively. Wallerstein 
explains that he “could translate Braudel’s term [into English] by inserting a hyphen (thus ‘world-
economy’ instead of ‘world economy’), the hyphen turning the adjective into an adjectival noun and 




regularly swapping visits between their top military leaders and heads of state. The 
relationship between the world's most populous nation and the world's most 
powerful nation is now deemed vital to world peace (Vogel, 1997).  
 
In the end, it does not matter who is the slave and who is the master. Their 
destinies are intertwined and they reluctantly acknowledge it. 
 
 
3.2 The Analytics of Interdependence and Recognition 
 
The end-results of the Hegelian dialectics is increasing interdependence between 
the two countries, and the strong incentives on each side to cooperate or collude 
even as they compete, rather than contemplating another fight to death. Using with 
the well-known Keynesian foreign trade multiplier, Cooper (1974) offered a useful 
mathematical exposition of the dynamics of mutual reliance. I will use a more 
explicit version of his model to provide the formal underpinnings for the discussion 
of the US-China external imbalances. Consider a two-country world where the 
macroeconomic linkages in each of them can be expressed as in equation (1), 
 
(1b)                                                         
 
(11a and 11b)                                    and             
 
(12a and 12b)                                  and             
 
(13a and 13b)                                and                
 
where   is still US national income,   is consumption, is   exports of goods 
and services, and   all other autonomous expenditure—all these variables in 
constant prices. The same relationships apply from the perspective of China, with 
an asterisk. Let’s define the marginal propensities to import in the two countries as 
measures of interdependence. For the U.S., we have  
 
(14a and 14b)                           /       and             /    
 
which is positive and less than unity. Using the marginal propensities to save as the 
unity minus the marginal propensity to consume 
 




By combining all these terms for both countries and differentiating totally, we 
obtain the following system of simultaneous equations: 
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where ∆ gives the well-known Keynesian foreign trade multipliers that allows for 
foreign repercussions, that is 
 
(18)                    ∆                                                 
 
Using   and    as measures of interdependence between the two countries, 
we can assess both the impact on world income and the impact on country income 
of an increased expenditure in the U.S. following Cooper’s methodology. It can be 
shown that a proportionate of   percent in both   and    affects interdependence 
in the two countries in the following ways: 
 
For the U.S., 
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Equations (18) and (19) tell a straightforward story: as the degree of 
interdependence between the U.S. and China rises, the impact of a given increase 
in expenditure on income in the U.S. declines while the impact on income in 
China rises. Incidentally, this may explains the intuition of some politicians who 
opposed the 2008-09 fiscal stimulus package in the U.S., which they characterized 
as additional spending on larger volumes of Chinese imports. 
 
Given that the marginal propensities to save differ in the two countries      
    , interdependence highlights compositional effects on the aggregate world saving  
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rate and hence on the total impact of world income. But even in the special 
situation where the marginal propensities to save would be strictly equal in the U.S. 
and China        ,  
 
(21)                                                     1/     
 
implying that the change in total (world) income would not be impacted by the 
values of   and   , and any gain in impact of increased expenditure on income in 
the U.S. as a result of changes in   and    would be offset by a proportionate 




3.3  The Politics of Exchange Rate Policies 
 
The exchange rate policy is a key angle for analyzing the US-China Hegelian 
dynamics. The exchange rate is the most important relative price in international 
finance. Because bilateral movements can be misleading indicators of the overall 
decline in the value of the dollar and the renminbi, it would be preferable to focus 
the analysis on the evolution of real effective exchange rates. But the meaning of 
what should constitute the “real” exchange rate in the context of competing 
deflators, and the process of calculating an “effective” rate raise many conceptual 
and empirical issues (Chinn, 2006). 
 
The sharp evolution in the official position of the current US government on 
China’s currency offers some evidence of the complexity of the relationship 
between the two countries. In a written statement to the Senate Finance Committee 
early in his tenure as Treasury Secretary, Timothy Geithner announced that 
“President Obama—backed by the conclusions of a broad range of economists—
believes that China is manipulating its currency. President Obama has pledged as 
President to use all the diplomatic avenues open to him to seek changes in China’s 
currency practices. While in the US Senate he co-sponsored tough legislation to 
overhaul the US process for determining currency manipulation and authorizing 
new enforcement measures so countries like China cannot continue to get a free 
pass for undermining fair trade principles.” (US Senate, 2009: 81). In the same 
statement, he also promised that his Department will make "the fact-based case that 
market exchange rates are a central ingredient to healthy and sustained growth."  
 
                                                            
26 Cooper (1974) offers an elegant generalization of these results to a three-country dynamics, by 
adding some additional complexities to the basic structure of the system of simultaneous equations 
in (16).   
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That call for Beijing to restrain the number of renmibi in circulation and 
increase its value vis-à-vis the dollar was perceived by investors around the world as 
a willingness to sustain the depreciation of the dollar in order to help U.S. 
exporters. Such a direct approach to the exchange rate issue seemed to mark a 
clear departure from the policy stance under President George W. Bush to never 
formally to brand China as a currency manipulator. It seemed at odd with the 
perspectives of very high fiscal deficits in the US, which implies additional dollar 
debt. 
 
Chinese authorities quickly responded to the new American position. At the 
2009 meeting of China's National People's Congress in Beijing, Prime Minister 
Wen Jiabao declared: "We have lent a massive amount of capital to the United 
States, and of course we are concerned about the security of our assets. To speak 
truthfully, I do indeed have some worries. So I call on the United States to maintain 
its creditworthiness, abide by its commitments and ensure the security of China's 
assets."
27 Chinese government officials also reminded their counterparts in the US 
that there is really no such thing as "market exchange rates," given that the supply of 
all modern currencies is set by monopolies known as central banks. Like all 
debtors, the US must continue to attract Chinese buyers for billions of dollars in 
new Treasury bonds to cover its increasing borrowing needs.  
 
The seemingly hard-line positions taken by both sides has softened quite 
rapidly—as it always does on such matters.
28 Only a few weeks after the strong stance 
taken by the US, the Group of 7 released a joint statement that read: “We welcome 
and appreciate the prompt macro-economic response from others throughout the 
world. In particular, we welcome China's fiscal measures and continued 
commitment to move to a more flexible exchange rate, which should lead to 
continued appreciation of the renminbi in effective terms and help promote more 
balanced growth in China and in the world economy.” This diplomatic statement 
was made more than a year after the Chinese monetary authorities actually stopped 




27 Quoted on CNN Money.com, June 2, 2009. 
28 News reports confirm that. According to http://money.cnn.com, when US Treasury Secretary 
Geithner met on June 2, 2009 with Chinese President Hu Jintao and Prime Minister Wen Jiabao, 
“the mood was more conciliatory.” Geithner indicated that he was not asked by his counterparts 
whether the US would inflate its way out of its fiscal deficits and weakening the dollar in the process. 
He basically brushed away the presumption that the US needs to reassure China of its 
creditworthiness. 
29 The G-7 statement was released on February 14, 2009. By that time, the 15-20 percent 
appreciation of the renminbi vis-à-vis the dollar had been halted for almost 15 months.  
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While there has been a gradual weakening of the dollar vis-à-vis other major 
currencies since 2002,
30 the true extent and economic significance of its declining 
value should be explored specifically on the dollar-renminbi exchange rate, which is 
actually what counts the most for the US current account deficit. Yet, it appears that 
in recent months the dollar has depreciated vis-à-vis the euro or the yen, while 
being stable against the Chinese currency (see Figure 2). The fact that the renminbi 
has in turn depreciated against all the major currencies despite large trade surpluses 
and capital inflows, increased productivity and renewed accumulation of foreign 
reserves
31 reveals an open secret: it has actually been informally pegged to the 
dollar. This is confirmed by the observation that for most of 2009, the only seven 
currencies that have been significantly weaker than the renminbi are the Icelandic 
krona, the Vietnamese dong, the Nigerian naira, the Argentine peso, the Iranian 
rial, the Costa Rican colon and the Pakistani rupee—all currencies from countries 
whose economies cannot be compared to the extremely dynamic Chinese 
economy. As Norris (2009) observes, “the results this year has made it clear that 
there is no basket, unless perhaps it is made up of the naira, the dong and the rial.” 
(Figure 2). 
 
Chinese monetary authorities have obviously objected to the accusation of 
manipulating the renminbi: “According to the Articles of Agreement of the IMF, 
‘member countries shall have the right to choose exchange rate regime, either free 
floating, managed floating or fixed exchange rate, at their own discretion’. In this 
sense, there exists no such an exchange rate regime that can be labeled as 
‘manipulating exchange rate’. China’s gradual shift from a relatively fixed 
arrangement to an exchange rate regime with greater flexibility in line with the 
needs of economic reform and opening up has won extensive support from the 
world community.” (Zhou, 2006). In July 2005, the People’s Bank of China 
launched the reform of reminbi exchange regime to improve the managed floating 
                                                            
30 The reasons for the depreciation of the dollar can be traced back to the bursting of the US 
tech-stock bubble in 2000-01, which had a substantial wealth effect on American households (Lin, 
2008). To minimize the duration and depth of the ensuing recession, the Federal Reserve 
aggressively eased monetary policy.  It lowered either the Fed funds rate or the discount rate 27 
times between January 2001 and June 2003, with the funds rate falling from 6.5 percent to 1.0 
percent over that period. This expansionary monetary policy averted a deeper recession. But its 
effects were compounded by the fact that US demand was stimulated by the substantial swing in the 
US fiscal position in the aftermath of the 2001 terrorist attacks, from a small surplus in 2001 to a 
sizeable deficit in 2003, which resulted from sharply increasing spending on defense and homeland 
security while cutting federal taxes. Combined with a low interest rate and low saving rate, the fiscal 
deficit contributed to large US current account deficits and higher demand for exports from 
developing countries such as China. 
31 As of October 15, 2009, China held $2.1 trillion worth of foreign reserves, equivalent to 49 
percent of its 2008 GDP or over 2 years of imports! In only the first half of 2009, China’s reserves 
increased by $186 billion.  
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system, with the goal of allowing market forces to gradually play a greater role in the 
supply and demand of foreign exchange. While this is not the “big bang” approach 
requested publicly by American officials, it has permitted the relaxation of controls 
on foreign exchange under capital account by firms and by individuals under 
current account. Yet, as apparent in Figure 2, the policy of letting the renminbi 
appreciate against the dollar seems to have been reversed in the middle of 2008. As 
explained by Zhou, “China as a large developing economy with heavy employment 
pressures and a still fragile financial system, could only adopt a gradualist approach 
to adjust its economy in a controllable manner.” (2006). 
 
However, the policy option pursued by China and often denounced in the US 
as second best or even third best
32 has not led to any strong retaliatory policy 
actions. To the contrary, recent official reports by the US government praise China 
for its efforts “towards greater capital account liberalization”.
33 This is actually the 
tacit recognition that the informal dollar-renminbi peg may be in the mutual interest 
of both countries, at least in the short term: it forces China to receive large amounts 
of dollars that are invested in American securities—especially Treasury bills. While 
that process may have contributed marginally to the financing of the housing bubble 
of 2002-2007 (the FED’s lax monetary policy being the primary factor), it has also 
kept interest rates low in the US—which has been good for growth. The global crisis 
has not fundamentally changed that equation: China needs a competitive exchange 
rate to sustain growth and accumulate much needed reserves and the US need a 
reliable buyer of T-bills issued to finance its stimulus package. 
 
The morals of the story, which is also the reason for the changes in tone and 
discourse, can be explained by fears on both sides, and the realization, just like 
characters in Hegel’s myth, that each country would be made worse off by an 
exchange rate war with the other. On the American side, the fear is that Beijing 
could theoretically abandon its key role in the financing the US budget deficit by 
curbing its huge purchases of US Treasury bonds. It is through these purchases that 
Beijing acts to hold down the renminbi, while boosting the dollar. On China’s side, 
there are fears that too strong pressures on the debtor might be counter-productive 
for the creditor. All sides understand that what is really important for China is to 
                                                            
32 Krguman for instance has denounced what he calls “China’s outrageous currency policy”: 
“with the world economy still in a precarious state, beggar-thy-neighbor policies by major players 
can’t be tolerated. Something must be done about China’s currency.” (2009) 
33 The US Treasury notes in a recent report that the PBC has implemented two pilot programs 
that allow corporations to settle their foreign trade in renminbi. It has also signed six bilateral 
currency agreements with other central banks totaling $95 billion. Since May 2009, several Hong 
Kong-funded banks have won approval to issue renminbi –denominated bonds in Hong Kong. 
Finally, the PBC is considering allowing domestic companies to lend funds to their foreign 
subsidiaries without obtaining prior approval from Chinese authorities. (2009: 14).  
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have an independent monetary policy aiming at stable prices and stable growth. As 
Prasad puts it, “flexibility of the currency is an essential prerequisite for this rather 
than an objective itself.” (2009: 227) 
 
Formally, the current situation is actually a Nash equilibrium.
34 If we consider 
the US-China as a strategic game, one can say that the large current account deficit 
in the US, compensated by a large surplus in China, the US-China exchange rate 
puzzle can then be seen as a finite, two-country game in strategic form with the 
entries  j i p  representing the payoffs to one of the two countries, the US. The 
payoffs to China are  j i p  . The indexes i  and  j  range over US and China 
strategies, respectively. A strategy pair denoted (
* i ,
* j ) and consisting of letting the 
dollar depreciate in order to help exports and improve the trade deficit while China 
pegs the renminbi to the dollar 
* j  has the strategic equilibrium property because 
the US’s choice of 
* i  is its best response to China’s choice of 
* j , and vice versa. 
Formally, from the perspective of the US, the best maximization strategy is: 
* * j i p  = 
i
max
  * j i p  
China’s best maximization strategy 
* * j i p  = 
j
max
  j i p *   
can also be written as a minimization strategy 
* * j i p  = 
j
min
* j i p  
to express the existence of a saddle point in the hypothetical payoff matrix.  
 
An illustration of the Nash equilibrium in which the two countries find 
themselves is the proposal made by the governor of China's central bank, to create 
an international reserve currency with a stable value, rule-based issuance and 
manageable supply, a sort of "super-sovereign reserve currency" that would replace 
the dollar over the long run. His starting point was the observation that in the 
current system, issuing countries of reserve currencies are constantly confronted 
with the dilemma between achieving their domestic monetary policy goals and 
                                                            
34 I assume for the sake of argument that it is a zero-sum game. One can obviously question 
whether this dynamics can be modeled as a two player game; the economy is not just the result of 
economic policy, there are private actors too. And even the governments are not monolithic. One 
could easily imagine a U.S. Congress turning against the administration's conciliatory policies 
towards Beiking, or China’s head of the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) carrying 




meeting other countries' demand for reserve currencies. “On the one hand, the 
monetary authorities cannot simply focus on domestic goals without carrying out 
their international responsibilities; on the other hand, they cannot pursue different 
domestic and international objectives at the same time. They may either fail to 
adequately meet the demand of a growing global economy for liquidity as they try 
to ease inflation pressures at home, or create excess liquidity in the global markets 
by overly stimulating domestic demand.” (Zhou, 2009) He also suggested 
enhancing sharply the global role of special drawing rights (SDRs), the international 
asset created by the IMF in 1969 and recently given a boost by the decision of the 
G-20 to expand its issuance by $250 billion.
35  
 
While several other emerging countries, including Brazil and Russia have 
expressed support for a new reserve currency, the US and some of its allies have 
been quick to reject them, reaffirming their confidence in the irreplaceable global 
role of the dollar. The refusal to even entertain China’s proposal was mostly 
motivated by the fear that a prolonged debate could weaken international 
confidence in the dollar, driving down its value and prompting a sharp rise in the 
Euro and other currencies. Moreover, instability in exchange rate markets and the 
likely rise in global interest rates would have worsened the global recession. Clearly, 
Zhou’s proposal was also partly motivated by the fact that China holds large 
amounts in dollar reserves and therefore runs the risks of suffering major financial 
losses if there is a lot of confidence in the American currency because of the large 
and sustained US budget deficits would translated into major losses for China. Yet, 
if given credibility by financial markets, the very idea that the dollar could be loose 
its status as the premier world reserve currency could be costly to China.
36 
 
3.4  Hegel’s Dialectics and Issues of Global Imbalances 
 
Econometric analyses of the issues of global imbalances have yielded important 
insights on the various determinants of current account surpluses and deficits. But 
                                                            
35 The SDR was created to support the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate system. But only a 
few years after its launch, the Bretton Woods system collapsed and the world’s major currencies 
shifted to a floating exchange rate regime. In addition, the growth in international capital markets 
facilitated borrowing by creditworthy governments. Both of these developments lessened the need 
for SDRs. The SDR is neither a currency, nor a claim on the IMF, but simply a potential claim on 
the freely usable currencies of IMF members. Its users can obtain these currencies in exchange for 
their SDRs in two ways: first, through the arrangement of voluntary exchanges between members; 
and second, by the IMF designating members with strong external positions to purchase SDRs from 
members with weak external positions. 
36 Some American economists would welcome that perspective. Bergsten (2009a) writes that 
“China has accumulated its dollar hoard of more than $1,000 billion by keeping its currency 
substantially undervalued, through massive intervention in the foreign exchange markets, and thus 
deserves no sympathy if it takes losses on those dollars.”  
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they have not provided convincing interpretations of the broader US-China 
macroeconomic dynamics. The Hegelian master-slave framework helps shed light 
on the motivations and constraints surrounding these imbalances. It is important to 
remember that the point of the master-slave relationship is the ultimate 
interdependence and confluence of interests, the blurring of the lines between the 
participants, and the constant instability of status among parties—eventually, none of 
the parties is truly “master” or “slave”. Let’s examine the perspectives from China 
and the US, with the former assumed to be the master (creditor), and the latter 
considered the slave (debtor): 
 
3.4.1  A Powerless Creditor 
 
Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao has been quite straightforward in framing the 
issues facing his country and providing therefore a rationale for its macroeconomic 
and macro-political interactions with the US and the world: "A large population and 
underdevelopment are the two facts China has to face. Since China has 1.3 billion 
people, any small individual problem multiplied by 1.3 billion becomes a big 
problem, and any considerable amount of financial and material resources divided 
by 1.3 billion becomes a very low per capita level. This is a reality that the Chinese 
leaders have to keep firmly in mind at all times."
37 The population numbers have 
obviously changed quite a bit since then but the challenges remain the same. In a 
world where the US is still the most dominant country and certainly the largest 
economy, it is in China’s interest to exploit all the opportunities of globalization to 
solve its problems. The reality of today is that any country of its size would have to 
rely on the US economy for trade, investment and growth opportunities. 
 
The recent evolution of China’s current balances confirm that change in the 
country’s status: from a relatively modest surplus of $7.2 billion in 1996, it grew to 
$45.9 in 2003 and 673 in 2008. That is, a spectacular increase in less than a decade. 
Whether this spectacular change in China’s current account balance is due to 
domestic factors and constraints or more global ambitions, they reflect a complex 
dialectics. Notwithstanding the financial, economic and political benefits attached to 
the status of creditor of the largest industrialized economy in the World, the 
Chinese authorities understand that their country’s interests are dependent on a 
fruitful economic cooperation with the US. Ensuring the best possible relations with 
the rival (whom certain hardliners even consider to be the “enemy”) is therefore 
crucial to survival and prosperity. That is where the Hegelian master-slave dynamics 
                                                            
37 Speech at Harvard University, December 10, 2003.   
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gets into the picture: both sides realize that any sharp correction of the US-China 
imbalances would be a source of major risks.
38 
 
One important issue for China is demographics and its contingent liabilities 
implications. Its increasingly aging population has reinforced the need for savings. 
Population aging is a typically a phenomenon generally observed in developed 
countries, but China is already facing that challenge. This is the result of family 
planning policies introduced in the early 1970s with a view to curb population 
growth, and as part of the one-child policy implemented in the early 1980s. These 
policies, together with a decline in infant mortality rate and a rise in life expectancy, 
have allowed the country to make the transition from high birth rates, high death 
rates and high population growth to low birth rates, low death rates and low 
population growth in a relatively short time. The decline in child population before 
the graying of society increased the working-age proportion of the population and 
allowed for a decline in the percentage of dependents, which yielded a 
"demographic dividend” and contributed to economic growth. 
 
But things have changed substantially over the past decade: according to United 
Nations estimates, China’s population aged 60 or above will rise to 17.1 percent in 
2020 and to 24.0 percent in 2030. Taking into consideration the fact that the 
expected deceleration in the decline in the child population, the percentage of the 
working-age population could fall in the coming years, and the dependency ratio
39 
will begin to rise. A decline in the working-age population may lead to a decrease in 
the labor force, and the rise in the dependency ratio is highly likely to lead to a fall 
in savings rates.
40 These trends pose serious challenges to the country’s long-term 
growth prospects, and push the Chinese authorities into the Hegel dialectics: it has 
become crucial to ensure that they shift their objectives from being a net user to 
becoming a net supplier of funds to the safest international capital market—which is 
still seen to be the US, their main debtor country.  
 
Another important reason for the change in China’s current account position is 
the belief that despite the close economic and financial relationships with the US, 
there is no sense of shared purpose between the two countries—and there may 
never be one. For a substantial fraction of the populace in both countries, there will 
always be some deep suspicion, and the need to place a pejorative status—master 
                                                            
38 In an increasingly globalized world, such risks would affect other countries as well—especially 
those linked through trade and finance to the US; they will suffer the consequences of a reduction in 
the US external gap. 
39 The dependency ratio is the ratio of number of dependents (population aged 0-14 and 
population aged 65 and over) to the total population aged 15-64. 
40 It can be argued that the recent upward pressure on wages in coastal regions due to a decline 
in the supply of migrant workers (especially young workers) is a sign of this.  
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versus slave—on people on the other side.
41 In addition, even though China was not 
affect by the emerging market crises of the 1990s, the memories of the turmoil are 
still quite vivid with policymakers there, who have taken extra-precautions to 
prevent the kind of catastrophic events they observed in countries such as Thailand, 
Korea, Mexico, Russia or Brazil. Despite not having encouraged risky capital 
inflows in their own country, they worry about the loss of foreign lender confidence, 
the possibility of an overvalued exchange rate, and even the very idea of excessive 
short-term debt denominated in foreign currencies of the kind that led to painful 
crises elsewhere.  
 
Because of these memories and fears, and the lack of trust in their relationship 
with the US (an “unreliable partner” at best and an “arrogant and recalcitrant 
slave”),
42 their macroeconomic strategies embody a substantial dose of hysteresis. 
With that frame of mind, the Chinese authorities have resorted to the 
Confucianism principle of “He who will not economize will have to agonize.” They 
have built up large amounts of foreign exchange reserves, a strategy that has 
involved a shift towards surplus in China’s current account, reductions in gross 
private capital outflows, increases in gross capital inflows, or some combination of 
these measures. This war chest was not built for war but rather, to serve as a buffer 
against potential capital outflows.
43 But in the context of exchange rate management, 
they also served to prevent the appreciation of the currency and the promotion of 
exports.  
 
Global political economy factors should therefore be given prime consideration 
in the discussion of China’s current account surplus, as they provide another 
justification for the country’s Hegelian posture on issues of global imbalances. 
Globalization has provided a major impetus to China’s ambition of greatness, which 
obviously pre-dates the modern era.
44 In a macroeconomic strategy that could be 
                                                            
41 One can find evidence of mutual suspicion in the results of various surveys. In October-
November 2009, the Pew Research Center surveyed 1,000 foreign policy experts, including US 
government officials and university professors. 642 of them responded. Asked which countries or 
territories will be more important future US allies, 58 percent chose China, which ranked third in 
2005. The research center also surveyed 2,000 civilians aged 18 or older about favorability of 
countries. 44 percent (highest number) China as the world's leading economic power (and the US 
second with 27 percent), which they only placed eighth in terms of favorability. 
42 To understand the level of distrust of the US and the West in general among the Chinese 
political elite, see the recently published memoir of Zhao Ziyang, the purged Communist Party chief 
and former prime minister of China, who was removed from power in 1989 after he opposed the 
use of force against democracy protesters in Tiananmen Square. 
43 This point is convincingly made by Bernanke (2005). 
44 Once called upon by journalists to respond to criticism from the American President about 
his country’s poor track record on human rights, China’s President Jiang Zemin (1993-2003) 
reminded his interlocutor that it would be bizarre for him, the Head of a state that had more than  
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compared to Hegel’s notion of defining and asserting self-consciousness, the 
Chinese government has gone so far as to mobilize domestic saving and using the 
proceeds to buy American securities, that is, issuing domestic debt to Chinese 
economic agents or running fiscal surpluses in order to increase foreign reserves. 
By diverting domestic saving from their country’s needs into the US capital market, 
they have essentially confirmed their desire to play an even more important role on 
the world stage. This is reflected by China’s repeated calls for greater voice and 
participation on the boards of major multilateral organizations like the World Bank 
or the International Monetary Fund.  
 
Some economists have expressed concern that China, which has become the 
largest buyer of American assets and its most important creditor may decide to 
change their foreign investment strategy, and stop funding the large US current 
account deficit. While China’s foreign reserves managers could, in principle, 
abruptly shift their interest and focus to other markets and currencies such as the 
Euro or the Yen, the reality is they have very few incentives to do as, for one 
important reason: any major economic catastrophe in the US (major recession or 
high inflation in the US, large depreciation of dollar-denominated assets, etc.) 
would also hurt their country profoundly. It would disrupt their most important 
market, jeopardize their country’s growth prospects, and drastically impair their 
ability for addressing some of the pressing daunting issues on their development 
agenda. 
 
China’s development model makes it necessary to retain some form of capital 
controls in the foreseeable future. Its growth strategy relies heavily on rapid capital 
formation or fixed asset formation, which accounted for an estimated 45 percent of 
GDP in 2008. This level of investment is almost unprecedented for large 
economies. For instance, the fixed asset investment ratio in the U.S. never rose 
much higher than 20 percent, even during the peak period of its industrialization 
between 1889-1913, and the post World War II reconstruction phase of 1946-55. 
In Japan, the highest the ratio ever reached was about 32 percent in the 1960s and 
1970s. In Germany, it only reached about 21 percent during the heavy investment 
periods from 1891-1913 and again from 1952-58 (Shan, 2005). Such a high level 
can only be maintained because in addition to the inflow of foreign direct 
investment, the controls of the country’s capital account do not allow economic 
agents to explore higher returns abroad and therefore leave few options to but to 
save or invest at home. Lifting capital controls and allowing the renminbi to float 
freely could very well result in an outflow of private savings, which would cause a 
depreciation of the currency—not the outcome most policymakers in the Western 
                                                                                                                                                                  
5,000 years of history, to respond to injunctions by the President of a small, junior country (the US) 
of only some 2000 years of experience…  
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world hope for. Moreover, because Chinese growth is currently sustained by high 
levels of investment, the complete relaxation of capital controls could also lead to 
scarcity of capital and disruption of trade in the short run, and a deceleration of 
economic activity. Since a modest revaluation of the renminbi would only 
encourage speculative inflow of capital, exacerbating the pressure on China's money 
supply, the optimal adjustment strategy for the medium-term may be for China: (a) 
to agree to the appreciation of the exchange rate; and (b), to let the currency float 
within a managed band against a basket of currencies under the current regime of 
continued convertibility on the current account but capital account controls. 
 
Given its current development strategy, China also has few incentives to curb its 
financial inflows. While there has been a surge in non-FDI capital inflows to China 
in the past decade (Prasad and Wei, 2005), much of the country’s reserve 
accumulation has been in FDI, which is a positive outcome for the country. The 
usual rationale for not holding very high levels of reserves is two-fold: first, they are 
typically held in treasury bonds denominated in hard currencies whose rate of 
return is often assumed to be lower than rates that could be earned investment 
projects within developing countries where there is presumably a shortage of 
capital. Second, going back to equation (9) in the previous section, it appears that 
capital inflows that are part of the reserves accumulation process can increase 
liquidity in the banking system and create moral hazard issues in a poorly 
supervised environment.
45 But that rationale does not fit well China’s particular 
situation: with its very high investment rates supported by high domestic savings, 
capital scarcity is not an issue. Also, because domestic interest rates are maintained 
at low levels and the country’s reserves are held mostly in medium- and long-term 
treasury bills, there might be net benefits to sterilization and therefore no reason 
not to hold high levels of reserves. 
 
A further reason why the Nash equilibrium in the current global imbalances 
situation is unlikely to change substantially in the immediate future is the lack of 
incentive for all the major players involved to make abrupt adjustments in the 
international role of the dollar. Since being enthroned as the leading global 
currency after World War II, it has attracted and maintained confidence of 
policymakers and private agents from all over the world. Despite the breaking down 
of the system of official exchange rate parities in 1971, the launch of the Euro in 
1999, and the regular predictions of economic woes in the US, it is still the 
preferred vehicle for international commercial transactions, the currency of choice 
in the interbank spot and forward exchange markets, of international capital flows, 
                                                            
45 While sterilization of capital inflows could be used to avoid excess liquidity in the domestic 
financial sector, the fiscal cost of effective instruments is often substantial: the rate of return on 
sterilization instruments is usually much higher than the yield on reserve holdings.  
38 
 
of invoice for primary commodity trade, and for a large number of industrial goods 
and services. As a medium of exchange among more than 150 other national 
currencies, the dollar enjoys a degree of dominance that is comparable to a natural 
monopoly (McKinnon, 1996). Conspiracy theorists may complaint about that; the 
truth is that this happened by accident, just like the generalization of computer 
keyboards starting with the word “qwerty”. The dollar offers large economies of 
scale when used as the main instrument for international exchange. In theory, this 
could change any time. In reality, it would take the unlikely events such as a massive 
failure in economic and political governance or the eruption of hyperinflation in the 
US to dethrone the dollar. 
 
The advantages to the American economy and financial system of the 
international status of the dollar are enormous: the US constantly benefits from an 
almost unlimited, revolving line of credit, denominated in its own currency, with 
other economies of the world. This soft budget constraint provides an invaluable 
guarantee that its economic agents (firms, households, government) will not be 
subject to currency risks—and immunized from the potential costs of dollar 
depreciation. Whereas other debtors must constantly think about the potential 
costs of foreign exchange risk and the challenges of currency mismatches for their 
portfolio, US agents can enjoy the privileges of borrowing on international markets 
in their own currency.
46 From a purely ethical point of view, one can wonder 
whether it is fair that the world’s richest economy can cheaply and continuously 
draw on the limited global pool of savings (mostly from developing countries) to 
finance its over-consumption. However, if ethics is defined not as rigid and 
normative system of moral principles but rather as a framework by which decisions 
are to be judged within their context,
47 then there is little basis for judging the 
pertinence of decisions that are presumably made with the goal of gaining mutual 
benefits, in full knowledge of their economic and financial implications by all the 
parties involved. 
 
Once again, one can see the Hegelian dynamics at play: the interests of masters 
and slaves are intertwined. On the one hand, the US has no interest in taking any 
action that would result in the loss of the economic and financial advantages yielded 
by the international status of the dollar. On the other hand, China and other 
debtors have good, structural reasons for accumulating positions in US equities: 
portfolio investors from around the globe see no other country in the world with a 
                                                            
46 The assets of American financial institutions, which are very often claims on their domestic 
economy, are denominated in dollars; the same is often true for their liabilities (deposits), mostly 
owned by foreigners. The intrinsic dose of moral hazard built into such a system certainly 
encouraged over-leveraging by American financial institutions and contributed to the 2007 global 
financial crisis. But on balance, the long-term payoff [to be completed] 
47 Appiah (2009) offers an interesting account of the contribution of psychology to ethics.  
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better business environment (especially whe n  i t  c o m e s  t o  p r o p e r t y  r i g h t s  f o r  
foreigners) or more profitable opportunities; likewise, fixed income investors 
consider that no other bond markets in the world can offer the kind of depth and 
liquidity that they have in the US bond market (Burger and Warnock, 2006). Thus, 
in order to preserve its wealth, almost all players involved in the global imbalances 
game would rather preserve the status quo than attempt to unilaterally change the 
rules. 
 
3.4.2  A Powerful Debtor 
 
Let’s now look at the Hegelian dialectics between China and the US from the 
perspective of the latter. A joke by comedian Jon Stewart on the TV program The 
Daily Show can help make the point. Poking fun at US President Barack Obama 
for his decision to delay a meeting with the Tibetan leader Dalai Lama in favor of 
strengthening relations with China, Stewart said sarcastically: “We don’t want to 
upset China! Gosh!... Imagine what they would put in our toys and toothpaste if we 
upset them!...” Like most TV jokes on international economics, this one was quite 
tasteless. Still, it made a couple of important points: first, it highlighted the reliance 
by US on China as the source for a large fraction of consumer goods for its large 
domestic market. Second and perhaps more important, it conveyed the implicit 
acceptance (which almost rises to the level of addiction) by American households 
and firms of these cheap imports from a country often viewed with suspicion by 
politicians and located thousands miles away.  
 
The popular success and market dominance of large distribution, cost-cutting 
chains confirms that economic agents in the US are getting accustomed to the 
various facets of globalization and the rise of mega-corporations. China’s economic 
effect is double-edged: because of its cheap production costs, it can produce mass-
market consumer goods for large distribution companies such as Wal-Mart. As a 
consequence, American consumers benefit from lower prices, even if they do not 
shop at Wal-Mart. But such dependency carries major economic costs (limited 
competition
48), which are probably factored in the attitude of American consumers, 
and their acceptance of cheap foreign products. China currently has the edge in that 
competition: many of its firms can aggressively reduce prices, which allows them to 
gain market shares abroad. In fact, the country has won a larger piece of a shrinking 
world trade in 2008-09 because consumers demanded lower-priced goods that 
                                                            
48 Fishman (2006) makes the point that Wall-Mart has become too big to be subject to market 
forces or traditional rules. His suggests that the company has changed US consumer habits by 
accustoming the American consumer to expect and to demand low prices, and to immediately 
suspect that any product that has a higher price tag than its Wal-Mart equivalent must be a rip-off. 
The so-called Wal-Mart ethos has replaced the expectation of quality with low cost, which used to 
be the primary criterion for consumers.  
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Chinese factories could deliver.
49 Besides enjoying a competitive exchange rate, 
benefiting often from government subsidies (through tax credits) and large low-
interest loans from state-run banks, these factories had the ability to quickly cut 
prices by reducing costs of production (including wages) in areas where migrant 
workers are employed. Given the country’s diversified portfolio of low-priced and 
necessary goods matched by few competitors around the world, it is now clear that 
its manufacturing sector could hold up quite well even in a recession. Over time, 
these basic stylized facts of globalization will change as accumulation of capital takes 
place in China, higher incomes lead to wages increases and the shortage of low-cost 
labor in some industries, and the process of industrial upgrading takes place. Quite 
logically, such a dynamic economy will have to move up the value chain and 
produce more higher-priced goods (pharmaceuticals, aircrafts, computer ships, 
etc.), which will require higher wages. As they become richer, Chinese workers will 
then consume more and buy more of their own goods, which will contribute to the 
rebalancing of the global economy. In the meantime, just like in the Hegelian 
metaphor, the American economy currently needs cheap products from China, 
which in turns needs the large US markets for its exports. 
 
Another important element to consider is the available margin to lower US 
consumption. Conventional wisdom has it that much of the global imbalances 
problem would be resolved if consumption in America was substantially reduced in 
favor of productive investment and higher net exports. To put things in perspective, 
one should remember that US private consumption represented about $10 trillion 
in 2008 (about 16 percent of global output), compared to $9 trillion in the 
European Union and less than $5trillion for Asia. Private consumption in emerging 
economies such as India, Brazil, Russia or South Africa cannot match the buying 
power of American consumers. For the very optimistic scenario of a permanently 
lower level of consumption in the US compensated by a permanently higher level 
of consumption in developing countries to materialize, there should be a change in 
the composition of world demand—this is because the composition of any given 
country’s consumption depends on its per capita income.
50 But engineering such a 
structural change in the composition of world consumption at the global level and 
adjusting the structure of world production would require large investments—and 
time. 
 
The sudden rise in the personal saving rate in the U.S. from about 1 percent in 
2007 to 5 percent in early 2009 has given credence to such calls. However, it is 
                                                            
49 In 2009, China displaced Canada as the largest supplier of imports to the U.S.. 
50 Giavazzi (2009) rightly points out that such changes in the composition of goods demanded 
are already taking place: primary commodity producers, especially in Latin America, are benefiting 
from the demand shifts towards China and India.  
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doubtful that such rebalancing of domestic demand in America could realistically 
take place without a sharp decline in economic growth in a country where 
consumption has consistently represented about 70 percent of GDP, especially in 
the context of a sluggish world economy. I t  i s  t r u e  t h a t  U S  c o n s u m p t i o n  h a s  
declined slightly in recent months. Anecdotal evidence also suggests that 
conspicuous consumption in the US may have been affected by the global 
economic crisis (Dewan, 2009). Pointing out that the Great Depression created a 
generation of cautious savers, these new trends are generating optimism among 
researchers. It is even projected that because of the recession, American 
households could increase their savings to about 4 percent of disposable income 
(income after taxes), which would translate into a sustained fall in their 
consumption equivalent to about 3 percent of GDP (Giavazzi, 2009). "Though the 
recession was always talked about in economic terms, we felt really strongly that, in 
fact, it was a crisis of culture," said Tracy Johnson, a director for a market research 
firm, who also views the recession as “a rite-of-passage that will reorder consumer 
priorities” (quoted in Dewan, 2009). Such statements are overly optimistic: the 
adjustment in US consumption and saving is probably more a temporary, 
emergency response than a permanent recalibration of economic behavior, 
financial habits and general attitude towards intertemporal choices. 
 
True, the substantial increase in household debt in America rose from 77 
percent of disposable income in the 1990s to 127 percent before the crisis in 2008 
may have been related to the housing bubble and to financial innovation, which 
allowed private agents to capitalize and consume their perceived gains in wealth 
from rising real estate prices. It is therefore conceivable that the burst of the bubble 
and the recession can “correct” such behavior and compel households to save. But 
the new restraint is not likely to last, for both economic and psychological reasons. 
First, cutting spending in an economy still in recession or recovering very slowly is 
not being encouraged by the US government. To the contrary, a substantial fraction 
of the fiscal stimulus package under implementation aims at strengthening the 
purchasing power of households and firms—and maintaining high levels of 
consumption. It is true, however, that the use of fiscal stimulus to compensate for 
the shortfall in consumer spending has its limitations: even assuming a positive 
multiplier, boosting public spending and cutting taxes can only be temporary 
measures, as they create unsustainable deficits. Eventually, private demand will have 
to rebound for the US economy to get back to a more balanced growth path. 
 
Second, it can be argued without exaggeration that consumerism is in the DNA 
of the US economy, just like extravagance and opulence are the twin engine of its 
system. One may recall that after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, 
P r e s i d e n t  G e o r g e  W .  B u s h  u r g e d  h i s  f e l l o w  c i t i z e n s  t o  g o  s h o p p i n g .  A n  
examination of the motives for spending in the US (why people buy the things they  
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do, and why they are so willing to trade their most valuable, non-renewable 
resource -- time -- in exchange for them) reveals that consumerism is deeply 
ingrained in the American psyche. The quest for social status plays a big role in 
such decisions (Schor, 1998). This is evidenced by the difference in brand 
consciousness between socially visible and socially invisible products: people care 
more about the brand of jacket they wear or coffee they drink than about the brand 
n a m e  o n  t h e  f u r n a c e  i n  t h e  b a s e m e n t  o r  the life insurance policy in their file 
cabinet—products which are arguably more important. 
 
Moreover, even in the unlikely scenario that American consumers drastically 
change their cultural and spending habits and suddenly become as thrifty as 
Japanese consumers, an unresolved question would be whether their government 
can also reign in its large budget deficit. The US federal budget deficit is projected 
to reach $ 1.6 trillion in 2009 (11.2 percent of GDP, the highest level since World 
War II), and to remain well above the $1 trillion mark for most of the coming 
decade. For the world economy, the potential costs of large projected budget 
deficits in the U.S. are substantial: global interest rates could rise and emerging 
market borrowing could be crowded out from global markets.
51 The immediate 
causes to that level of deficit are well known: (i) the recession has reduced 
anticipated tax revenue while increasing spending for safety net programs such as 
unemployment benefits or food stamps. (ii) Expansionary fiscal policy was also 
deemed necessary to stimulate the economy and avoid a second Great Depression. 
(iii) The cost of interest incurred on the expansion of federal debt has been on the 
rise—from 33 percent of GDP in 2000, it is projected to reach 68 percent in 2019. 
The more structural causes of the U.S. deficit are the trends in the two most 
important social programs—Medicare and Social Security—which are expected to 
balloon for several decades, as baby boomers reach retirement age. 
 
As implied in equation (7), large budget deficits are likely to induce a vicious 
circle that worsens the US trade/current account deficit and foreign indebtedness. 
Lessons from economic theory and from history suggest that a country saddled with 
fiscal deficits and ever-increasing debt can run out of viable macroeconomic 
strategies: the possibility of default on the sovereign debt, or a traumatic collapse in 
the value of the currency. Yet, in another twist of Hegelian dialectics, American 
policymakers are not too worried about such catastrophic scenarios. Investors 
around the world simply do not envisage that the U.S. could be unable to pay some 
                                                            
51The empirical literature on this issue is mixed. One can argue that there is a negative 
correlation between the U.S. debt and the yield spread between sovereign bonds from emerging 
markets and the U.S. Treasury debt—the former offering an alternative to the latter. But it seems 
more plausible that an increase in the U.S. Treasury rates due to larger deficit projections is likely to 
be met by an even larger increase in yields on all risky assets (especially from emerging economies), 
as investors request higher compensation for the extra risk. See Celasun (2009).   
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holders of its bonds—though it is almost certain that future inflation will substantially 
alleviate the burden of repaying some of the debt. Nor do they believe that a 
sudden crash in the value of the dollar is likely, despite its recent declining trend. 
 
Moreover, looking at the evolution of the debt-to-GDP ratio, which is the 
conventional way of assessing sustainability,
52 it appears that the projections may not 
be as alarming as they seem. It is estimated that even an increase of 40 percentage 
points in America’s debt would only cost an additional 1 percent of GDP or 5 
percent of government revenue in real interest (U.S. interest rates are still quite low 
by historical standards and the government has been borrowing long-term money at 
less than 3.5 percent). Other industrial countries with stable and well-established 
democratic systems have experienced high debt ratios without suffering financial 
crises: Belgium and Italy recorded debt-to-GDP ratios well above 110 percent in 
the 1990s. Japan’s ratio has been above 150 percent since the beginning of the 
decade and is currently around 200 percent; it is also true that it differs from the 
U.S. in several important ways: personal savings there are much higher and less 
than 10 percent of the country’s debt is held by foreigners, compared to 46 percent 
of America’s debt. Even more important is the fact that Japan seems immunized 
from a sudden sell-off of government bonds: about 50 percent are held by the 
public sector, and the other half is held by long-term investors (banks, insurance 
companies, pension funds, etc.) who are strongly encouraged to keep them because 
of existing regulations.  
 
Still, if economic theory is to be used as a guide, there is always the possibility of 
a negative scenario, that is, persistent deficits that eventually drives up interest rates 
as public and private sectors compete for funds. Higher interest rates would then 
increase the cost of servicing the debt and raise the theoretical risk of default. And 
if the Federal Reserve were to print more money to monetize the debt and thereby 
reduce its burden, the supply of dollars would shoot up, lowering its value even 
further in a negative spiral. But the Hegelian framework suggests that China would 
not gain from such a doomsday scenario and would not take any policy action 
conducive to it. For all the fear of shifts away from the dollar as the reserve 
                                                            
52 As I indicated elsewhere (Monga, 2004) fiscal sustainability does not simply refers to a 
government’s ability to finance itself. It also requires fiscal and monetary policies to be consistent 
with the expected growth, inflation and interest rates. Sustainability does not necessarily implies that 
the government be able to pay off its debt in the long-run. It implies that real debt is increased only 
at a rate less than the real interest rate paid on it. In other words, the government is accountable for 
the net real interest rate (real interest rate, r, minus the real growth rate, μ) paid on the debt to GDP 
ratio, b0 . This can be financed either with a primary surplus g – τ, or with seigniorage revenue, 
which is represented by the inflation tax paid on the money demand to GDP ratio, L(r+π) which is a 
decreasing function of nominal interest rate, (r+π). This sustainability condition is represented as: (g 
– τ) + (π+μ) · L(r + π) = ( r – μ ) · b0.  
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currency of choice, it simply has not yet occurred. In mid-2009, the dollar still 
accounted for more than 60 percent of global foreign reserves (see Figure 3). 
 
Even if one assumes that concerned foreign investors start requiring higher 
interest rates to hold US securities and that this lead to higher interest rates in the 
U.S. and the appreciation of the dollar. A stronger dollar, in turn, would make 
American goods and services more expensive abroad and imports cheaper, which 
only exacerbate the trade/current account deficit. High levels of wealth in US stock 
markets also tend to reinforce the willingness of American consumers to spend—
including on imports, which is the case when the dollar is relatively strong vis-à-vis 
other currencies. Again, from the perspective of the US-China relationship, one is 
back to the master-slave dialectics, where it becomes unclear who actually 
dominates whom. 
 
A third factor to be taken into consideration is the possibility that a substantial 
or abrupt reevaluation of the Chinese currency results in a large deceleration of 
growth in China (and a decline in global GDP), which would in turn hurt US 
exports and growth. In sum, China and the US may appear to hold keys roles in the 
global imbalances game. But they both actually have very few options at their 
disposal to fundamentally and abruptly change the dynamics of the situation. Just 
like the master and the slave in Hegel’s dialectics, both parties have legitimate fears 




This paper can be concluded with some broad generalizations about recent 
developments on global imbalances and some conjecture about the future. 
Traditional narratives of the US-China economic relations—whether based on the 
analysis of the dynamics of national accounts identities, trade flows or financial 
flows—have generated controversy and confusion and led to two opposing views of 
what each of the current situation, and what the two countries should be doing next.  
 
  The pessimistic view is that global imbalances are not only unsustainable 
but inherently dangerous, as they may have gloomy consequences for the 
world economy. Some (not all) of those who adhere to that thesis are 
warning about the accumulation of foreign liabilities by the U.S. and the loss 
of market confidence, which carry a high probability of an apocalyptic crash 
of the dollar and skyrocketing interest rates, with negative repercussions for 
both industrial and developing economies. To avoid the dismal scenario of 
a disorderly adjustment imposed by financial markets, they call for China to 
let its currency appreciate, rebalance its growth pattern from exports to  
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domestic demand by saving less and consuming more. Rejecting these calls, 
Chinese authorities consider global imbalances to be the result of poor 
macroeconomic policies in the U.S.. They warn about the potential costs of 
a sudden appreciation of the renminbi for China and the global economy, 
and in turn call for lower fiscal deficits and higher interest rates in the U.S.—
yet, these policies would also slowdown the global economic recovery and 
worsen the already concerning U.S. unemployment problem. 
 
  The optimistic view of the global imbalances rejects the assumption that 
financial markets can abruptly change their assessment of the sustainability 
of the U.S. This is based on the observation that there is no historical 
precedent of abrupt and disorderly exchange rate adjustments in 
industrialized countries where the financial systems are relatively well 
regulated and inflation have been kept in check. This leads to the view that 
the U.S. current account deficit and the China surplus are not anomalies 
but rather, the predictable outcome of a world with globalized financial 
flows in search of return. As Xafa puts it, “once capital flows are 
endogenized as functions of risk-adjusted returns and diversification 
opportunities, global imbalances become an equilibrium outcome of 
differences in potential growth rates and asset supplies across different 
countries and regions.” (2005 : 17). The conclusion is that global 
imbalances will be corrected through the normal functioning of markets as 
global growth becomes more balanced across regions (a slowdown in the 
U.S. compensated by acceleration in Japan, Latin America, or elsewhere). 
 
I have argued that the U.S.-China imbalances represent a sub-optimal situation 
because a weak renminbi drains off demand away from other producers around the 
world to Chinese exporters whose competitiveness is artificially maintained. 
However, fears about the worsening of the situation to the point that the world 
economy will suffer devastating consequences are widely exaggerated. The level of 
interdependence between the U.S. and China make any fundamental disagreement 
on economic policy—let alone a sustained conflict—highly unlikely. The U.S. 
currently has little incentive (and few reasons) to seriously implement a strategy to 
curb its fiscal and current account deficits; private consumption of cheap imports 
for China is an important part of its growth model, and China is also a creditor of 
choice to absorb large quantities of bonds issued to finance a fiscal deficit that is 
both structural (due to large retirement benefits to baby boomers, infrastructure 
needs and health care liabilities) and politically necessary. For the foreseeable 
future, China will remain largely dependent on the U.S. for its exports and will 
need the U.S. treasury bonds to absorb its huge stock of foreign reserves. In this  
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situation, both countries are in a Nash equilibrium and have little incentive to 
change their policies abruptly. 
 
Calls for rebalancing China’s growth model must take into account the daunting 
challenges of shifting from exports to consumption, which includes the likelihood 
of higher unemployment in the short-term, and the major political economy risks 
associated with wide-ranging structural reforms in the financial system, the 
education and health sectors. In order to increase private consumption enough to 
compensate for a decline in the contribution of external demand to growth, the 
country will have to reorient the production of tradable goods towards domestic 
markets. This would require an economic and social adjustment of gigantic 
proportions, as a large number of less skilled workers currently employed in the 
tradable sector try to move to the nontradable sector where there will be more 
demand for existing and new services.
53 Because employment is more evenly 
distributed across industries in coastal areas (where the creation of special 
economic zones has facilitated access to credit, openness and competition) than 
inland (where it is dominated by agriculture), any strategy for rebalancing growth 
should account for its distributional effects. 
 
In fact, a broad view of history suggests that for many years, the two most 
dominant powers in the world today have been struggling with what philosophers 
have called “the politics of recognition”
54. Just like the characters in Hegel’s parable, 
the two countries have reached a stage each perceives its own identity as constituted 
in part by acknowledgement of its status by the other. The creditor (China) cannot 
be or think of itself as such unless the creditor recognizes its importance and shows 
respect—and the same goes for the debtor (the U.S.). 
 
Political leaders in both countries may have come to the same conclusion. 
Behind the sometimes heated rhetoric by some commentators in both China and 
the US, the two countries’ perceived interests are intertwined in to the point that the 
rebalancing the global economy can only take place smoothly and gradually. While 
macroeconomists were debating the danger of global imbalances, President Barack 
                                                            
53 The manufacturing sector employs less skilled workers that the services sector, with more than 
70 percent of its workforce having attained less than a junior school degree, compared to 35-50 
percent in services. This differential suggests the possibility of skills mismatches in the shift of labor 
resources from the tradable to the nontradable sector. See Guo and Ndiaye (2009). The 
nontradable sector, defined as including the tertiary and construction, accounted for 37 percent of 
employment in 2007. It has been responsible for most job creation in recent years, thanks to the 
government’s decision to provide reemployment to laid-off workers from the restructuring of state-
owned enterprises that occurred in the late 1990s. 
54 Recognition here should be understood as acknowledgment and accommodation. For 
theoretical developments of the concept, see Taylor (1994), Honneth (1995) and Appiah (2005).  
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Obama declared during his recent trip to Beijing that relations between the two 
countries are at "at an all-time high." (Higgins and Kornblut, 2009) He hailed China 
as an economic partner that has "proved critical in our effort to pull ourselves out of 
the worst recession in generations" and described its rising prosperity as "an 
accomplishment unparalleled in human history…The major challenges of the 21st 
century, from climate change to nuclear proliferation to economic recovery, are 
challenges that touch both our nations, and challenges that neither of our nations 
can solve by acting alone." President Hu Jintao responded in kind that "There are 
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Figure 3: Currency Composition of Foreign Reserves, 1999-2008,  
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